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A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-
rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that
implies. - Prince v. Massachusetts
i. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has known for over a half century that the survival
of our constitutional polity ultimately depends on the proper cultivation of
children's "hearts and minds." This idea was expressed most directly in
2Brown v. Board of Education, where a unanimous Supreme Court concluded
that segregated schooling affects the psychological well-being of African-
American schoolchildren in a way that undermines "the very foundation of
good citizenship.0 On many other occasions as well, the Justices have
formulated constitutional doctrine to foster the development of
psychological skills in future citizens.4 Yet for all the normative force of this
idea, its meaning has never been fully explained or elaborated, nor even
likely understood. Courts and commentators have not paused to analyze
with care the relationship between child development and democratic
citizenship as an issue of any importance in constitutional law. To the
contrary, over the last fifty years constitutional law has actually lost sight of
the critical developmental affiliation between hearts and minds. This Article
aims to reintroduce constitutional law to the importance of children's
psychological development by presenting a comprehensive theoretical and
empirical account of the connection between early caregiving relationships
and the reasoned thinking of adult citizens.
The ideal of the autonomous individual capable of meaningful choice
and informed decisionmaking is a core operative concept in modern
constitutional law, central to contemporary accounts of individual liberty
and democratic self-government. 5 Yet an understanding of reason's
empirical substrata-what it actually means psychologically for an individual
to lead a self-defined life and to participate in the activities of democratic
self-government-has yet to emerge. Easily identified are the conditions of
mind excluded from reason: irrationality, emotional excess, inner
compulsions, external coercions, and instinctual drives. But identifying with
any specificity what reasoned thinking involves is much less clear. Certainly
1. 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).
2. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 644 (1942) (Black &
Douglas, JJ., concurring); see also infra Part II.A.
5. For a recent elaboration of the value of democratic citizenship in constitutional law,




an individual's capacity for leading a self-directed life and participating in
the processes of democratic self-government entails much more than the
cognitive skills of information processing, logical analysis, and conceptual
thinking. At a minimum, a citizen must be able to identify his or her beliefs,
values, and commitments and to think and act in a manner consistent with
those choices. Because beliefs, values, and commitments are not always clear
or consistent, critical reflection has an essential role to play in the process of
reasoned thinking. Sources of emotional understanding such as empathy
and intuition also contribute to the capacity for reason, as do the mature
psychological skills of emotional regulation. The psychological skills of
citizenship so defined encompass both heart and mind: basic cognitive
abilities as well as the integrated psychological capacities for personal self-
reflection and emotional self-mastery.
It is the process of becoming a citizen in the full psychological sense of
the term-how we acquire the integrated cognitive and emotional capacities
of mature reasoned thinking-that makes understanding how children
develop so vital to the elaboration of our most deeply held constitutional
ideals. Research on children's psychological development provides a starting
point for conceptualizing the maturational trajectory from infancy to adult
citizenship. This developmental research teaches that the emotional and
cognitive skills of reasoned thinking are not necessary, self-executing, and
inevitable attributes of human existence, but rather begin to develop in the
context of the early caregiving relationship. While the early caregiving
relationship is not the only context relevant to the development of reasoned
thinking, it is arguably the most important. Being the first, it establishes a
template for the influence of later relationships, including teachers, friends,
spouses, partners, and children, across the span of the individual's life. And
being affect-driven, it gives rise to a psychological world in which emotion
and cognition cannot be separated. Feeling is thinking in the earliest
months of life. Developmental research shows us in what way early family
relationships are the source of our most emotionally charged attachments
and commitments as well as our capacity for integrating and managing our
deeply felt passions and prejudices.
The implications of developmental research for constitutional law are
simply stated: When sufficiently responsive to a young child's needs, early
caregiving relationships help to cultivate the cognitive and emotional
processes that are the foundation for adult citizenship. Developmental
research does more than simply confirm the common sense proposition that
well-functioning families are good for children and therefore good for
society. The field helps us to identify with specificity the caregiving
conditions most likely to foster the cognitive and emotional skills required of
democratic citizens. Developmental researchers cannot identify with any
degree of precision the point at which the quality of childrearing falls below
the threshold required for the normal processes of psychological
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development to unfold. Nor can developmental psychology explain why
some children who lack good-enough caregiving nevertheless grow up to
become psychologically robust adults. What developmental psychology does
provide is empirical information showing that good-enough caregiving, in
the aggregate and over time, makes an essential early contribution to the
development of those psychological capacities that are necessary to the
maintenance and flourishing of our modern democratic polity.
A developmental perspective on citizenship poses a challenge to
traditional views about children and families in constitutional law. Despite
the fact that political scientists and cultural anthropologists have been
writing for decades about the family's important role in the political
socialization of children, ° constitutional and family law scholars have largely
avoided the subject.7 Feminists and family law scholars criticize the idea of
the family as a private enclave separate and apart from the public sphere,"
but these critics shy away from identifying the existence of a distinctly public
role for the family in raising future citizens.9 Similarly, modern
constitutional scholars tend to regard family relationships as more
6. See generally RICHARD E. DAWSON & KENNETH PREWIT, POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION
(1969); ROBERT D. HESS &JUDITH V. TORNEY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL ATIITUDES IN
CHILDREN (1967); M. KENTJENNINGS & RICHARD G. NIEMI, GENERATIONS AND POLITICS (1981);
Richard M. Merelman, The Family and Political Socialization: Toward a Theoy of Exchange, 42 J.
POL. 461 (1980); Ross D. Parker & Raymond Buriel, Socialization in the Family: Ethnic and
Ecological Perspectives, in 3 HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 463 (William Damon & Nancy
Eisenberg eds., 5thed. 1998).
7. For important exceptions, see BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL
STATE 140-54 (1980), which examines the family's role in the development of the "cognitive,
linguistic, and behavioral" skills necessary for adult citizenship, and DAVID J. HERRING, THE
PUBLIC FAMILY 59-65 (2003), which examines the family's "socialization function."
8. The feminist and family law literature on family privacy is enormous. For some
representative articles, see generally David Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV.
527 (2000); Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything That Grows"." Toward a History of Family
Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 819; Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and
Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983); Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as
Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996); Symposium, Privay and the Family, 67 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1207 (1999) (including articles by Martha Albertson Fineman, Naomi R. Cahn, &
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse).
9. See, e.g., HERRING, supra note 7, at 59-65. Political theorists such as Jean Bethke
Elshtain recognize, but do not explore, the empirical basis for the family's political role. See
generally JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, PUBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WOMEN: WOMEN IN SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL THOUGHT (1993). Susan Moller Okin and Michael Walzer explore the political status
of women in the family but do not address the political socialization of children. See generally
SUSAN MOLLER OKIN,JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY (1991); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF
JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1990). Other feminist theorists have
identified the unique importance of caregiving to collective life but have tied it to an ethic of
care rather than to the political socialization of children. See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON
FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY
TRAGEDIES (1995); MONA HARRINGTON, CARE AND EQUALITY: INVENTING A NEW FAMILY POLITICS
(1999); ROBIN WEST, CARING FORJUSTICE (1999); Naomi Cahn, The Power of Caretaking, 12 YALE
J.L. &FEMINISM 177 (2000).
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appropriately governed by the values of free choice and personal autonomy
than by the norms of democratic political life.' ° Contemporary political
theorists acknowledge the role of families, schools, religious associations,
neighborhoods, and other social groups in the socialization of children, but
most of these theorists do not give adequate attention to what is distinct
about family relationships. Families are broadly classified with other social
groups without any careful analysis of the actual empirical mechanics of
child development. 1 By failing to undertake a close empirical examination
of the family's contribution to children's development as citizens,
constitutional and family law scholars overlook the possibility that early
caregiving provides something unique in the socialization process, beyond
the usual reach of civil associations in a liberal democracy. Later
associations, most notably educational ones, will contribute to the
development of democratic skills and values, but the foundational processes
of democratic citizenship are laid down in the early caregiving years.
This Article's elaboration of the need for an empirically grounded
developmental perspective in constitutional law is new, but Supreme Court
attention to the issue of democratic socialization is not. Part II describes how
the Supreme Court has been engaged in a quiet debate over the place of
children in a democratic polity for the past half century. Much of this debate
has addressed the State's proper role in inculcating democratic values and
loyalties in public school children. Part II.A describes this debate as it
10. For an elaboration of this point, see Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just
Family, 67 TUL. L, REV. 955, 956 (1993); David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND.
L. REV. 527, 532 (2000).
11. See AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 14-16 (1987); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE,
AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 220 (2d ed. 1984); MICHAELJ. SANDEL, LIBERALISM
AND THE LIMITS OFJUSTICE 179 (1982). More recently, some scholars have advanced the view
that the decline of the traditional two-parent family undermines the development of
democratic virtues in children, such as tolerance, respect, and independence, but without any
solid empirical developmental support for that causal claim. See SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE: SOURCES
OF COMPETENCE, CHARACTER, AND CITIZENSHIP IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 35 (Mary Ann Glendon &
David Blankenhorn eds., 1995). William Galston has relied on social science data supporting
the family's role in fostering children's well-being, see William Galston, Causes of Declining Well-
Being Among U.S. Children, in SEX, PREFERENCE, AND FAMILY 290, 300 (David M. Estlund &
Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1997), although his conclusion that "the best anti-poverty program
for children is a stable, intact [two-parent] family" is rejected here. See infra IV.B; see also Martha
Albertson Fineman, The Family in Civil Society, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 531, 532-33 (2000) (arguing
that an emphasis on the two-parent family "operates to eclipse concern with social and
economic forces that are trnly destructive of families regardless of their form"); Iris Marion
Young, Mothers, Citizenship, and Independence: A Critique of Pure Family Values, 105 ETHICS 535, 545
(1995). David Popenoe draws on developmental research to argue that traditional two-parent
families are essential for instilling the skills of democratic citizenship. See David Popenoe, The
Roots of Declining Social Virtue: Family, Community, and the Need for a "Natural Communities Policy, "in
SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE, supra, at 71. Popenoe's application of developmental research in support
of two-parent families, rather than good-enough caregiving in whatever form it takes, has little
empirical support or normative appeal. See infta Part IV.B.
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emerged in the foundational cases of Meyer v. Nebraska,2 Pierce v. Society of
Sisters,'3 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,14 Prince v.
Massachusetts,15 and Brown v. Board of Education,16 and explores the
developmental themes that tie these cases together into a distinct tradition.
Part II.B takes note of the important turn toward empirical research in
Brown and the ensuing controversy over the application of developmental
research in constitutional decisionmaking. In Part II.C, this Article explains
how an empirical developmental perspective provides a much needed
revision of two fundamental assumptions relating to the political
socialization of children: that reason and emotion are distinct realms of
psychological experience and that schools are the primary venue for the
development of the skills of democratic citizenship. An account of the
importance of early caregiving to the development of democratic citizens
provides a necessary reworking of these two assumptions relating to the
democratic socialization of children in constitutional law.
Part III presents empirical research on the role of early caregiving in
the formation of the mental processes leading to the mature capacity for
individual reason. One of the most important factors in the development of
these early mental processes is the internalization of the relationship with a
"good-enough caregiver," one who is able to provide an emotionally attuned
and responsive environment for the child. The developmental research on
good-enough caregiving presented in this Part comes from a number of sub-
fields within the discipline of psychology, including neuroscientific,
cognitive, and social psychologies, but the primary framework derives from
the field of psychoanalytic developmental psychology. Psychoanalytic
developmental psychology provides a comprehensive picture of how the
early caregiving relationship interacts with the child's innate constitution to
create a differentiated self possessing the basic mental capacities necessary
for reasoned thinking. This Part explores how this dynamic interaction
between biology and caregiving gives birth to the child's psychological world
and eventually the capacity for leading an independent, self-directed, and
politically meaningful life. The importance of the social environment to the
early caregiving relationship, and the connection between early caregiving
and a democratic citizenry's vulnerability to societal regression at times of
political crisis, are the subject of Part III as well.
Part IV applies the developmental research described above to an area
of law that provides an ideal testing ground because it occupies a
constitutional terrain closest, in certain respects, to developmental issues.
12. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
13. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
14. 319 U.S. 624 (1942).
15. 321 U.S. 158 (1943).
16. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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This is the field of constitutional family law, a subject whose jurisprudential
span covers a range of doctrines, principally in the areas of privacy, equality,
and federalism. The fundamental principles of the developmental
approach-its empirical perspective, its focus on the relationship between
early caregiving and adult reasoned thinking, and its commitment to
securing the social preconditions to national citizenship-offer a substantial
reworking and integration of constitutional family law. As this Part explains,
a developmental approach refashions the doctrine of parental rights under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to encompass
constitutional protection for caregiving relationships. A focus on
development also supports congressional power to foster family caregiving
while at the same time setting limits on congressional authority over the
moral dimensions of family life. Finally, a developmental perspective
supports a circumscribed sphere of state sovereignty in matters relating to
children's welfare as a means of diffusing the national government's power
to mold developing citizens in its own image.
A final caveat is in order. While there is some overlap with
developmental psychopathology, the developmental approach taken here
does not define citizenship in terms of mental health. To the contrary, the
focus is on broadening access to the rights and duties of democratic
citizenship, particularly for impoverished children. It must be noted that
one of the main accomplishments of modern constitutional law has been the
elimination of barriers to full citizenship based on assumptions about a
particular group's incapacity for reason. The political disenfranchisement of
African-Americans, women, the poor, and non-English speaking immigrants
was justified at different times on the ground that these groups lacked the
capacity for reason, and the eradication of such barriers to citizenship
reflects the ascendance of an evolving, more inclusive ideal of membership
in the democratic polity. Yet the universal ideal of reason should not
become a barrier to probing the complex social, cultural, and economic
factors that affect the individual's capacity for acquiring the psychological
skills needed for leading a self-directed, politically engaged life. The ideal of
individual reason, standing alone, runs the risk of weakening democratic
values and institutions in the long run by neglecting the important social
and familial preconditions to adult citizenship. The developmental
approach presented in this Article looks beyond formal barriers to
citizenship, such as segregated schools and poll taxes, to address the less
visible, but no less formidable, internal barriers to children's future
membership in the democratic polity.'
7
17. This endeavor does not seek to make constitutional interpretation an empirical
enterprise. Rather the aim is to harness developmental research in an effort to promote and
realize our deepest constitutional norms. In this regard, the project has historical roots. See
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II. THE DEVELOPMENTAL TRADITION IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Developmental ideas have been an important but largely
unacknowledged part of constitutional decisionmaking for almost a century.
This Part first considers the role of developmental ideas in a series of early
Supreme Court cases addressing the State's interest in the political
socialization of children. The developmental tradition in constitutional law
began with a debate about the proper role of government in cultivating
democratic skills and values in young children, primarily in the context of
public education. This early series of cases culminated in 1954 with the
Supreme Court's application of empirical developmental research in Brown
v. Board of Education. In the aftermath of Brown, a controversy erupted over
the question whether constitutional law, given its unique design and
purpose, is fundamentally incompatible with the application of empirical
developmental research. This Part explains why the answer to this question
is unequivocally no: why, in other words, constitutional law needs
developmental research to modify prevailing common-sense assumptions
about the democratic socialization of children.
A. THE FOUNDA TIONAL CASES: MEYER, PIERCE, BARNETTE,
PRINCE, BROWN, AND THE EMERGING CONSTITUTIONAL INTREST
IN THE PoITICAL SOCIALIZATION OF CHILDREN
Over the course of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court grappled
with developmental issues in several of its major cases defining constitutional
liberties under the Due Process, Free Speech, and Freedom of Religion
Clauses. In a pair of cases decided in the 1920s, the Court struck down state
education laws based, in part, on assumptions about the political
socialization of children in a democratic society. In the first of these cases,
Meyer v. Nebraska,'9 the Supreme Court considered a challenge to a state law
forbidding the teaching of any modern language other than English to
primary school children.2z The Court quoted the Nebraska Supreme Court's
statement on the purposes of the statute:
The legislature had seen the baneful effects of permitting
foreigners, who had taken residence in this country, to rear and
educate their children in the language of their native land. The
result of that condition was found to be inimical to our own safety. To
allow the children of foreigners, who had emigrated here, to be
taught from early childhood the language of the country of their
parents was to rear them with that language as their mother
Christopher Tomlins, Framing the Field of Law's Disciplinary Encounters: A Historical Narrative, 34
LAw & Soc'Y REV. 911,948 (2000).
18. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19. 187 N.W. 100 (Neb. 1922).
20. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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tongue. It was to educate them so that they must always think in
that language, and, as a consequence, naturally inculcate in them
the ideas and sentiments foreign to the best interests of this
country.
21
While acknowledging that "the State may do much, go very far, indeed,
in order to improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and
morally," the Court nevertheless held that the statute was an
unconstitutional intrusion, "in time of peace and domestic tranquility," into
the parents' right to control their children's education under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 2 In considering the State's interest in inculcating
democratic values, the Court noted: "The desire of the legislature to foster a
homogeneous people with American ideals prepared readily to understand
current discussions of civic matters is easy to appreciate. Unfortunate
experiences during the late war and aversion toward every characteristic of
truculent adversaries were certainly enough to quicken that aspiration."2 3
Yet the Court held that "[n]o emergency has arisen which renders
knowledge by a child of some language other than English so clearly
harmful as to justify its inhibition with the consequent infringement of rights
long freely enjoyed."2 4 Moreover, the Court concluded, "[i]t is well known
that proficiency in a foreign language seldom comes to one not instructed at
an early age, and experience shows that this is not injurious to the health,
morals or understanding of the ordinary child. The parental right
recognized in Meyer rested on the view that early language acquisition was
not essential, in ordinary times, for the development of democratic "ideas
and sentiments" in children.2 a
Developmental concerns were also apparent in the second of the two
27
cases, Pierce v. Society of Sisters. This case involved the constitutionality of
Oregon's Compulsory Education Act, a law that required children to attend
public school through the eighth grade. Relying on Meyer, the Court held
that the Oregon statute "unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control.2 8 In a well-known passage, the Court explained:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in
this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from
21. Id. at 397-98 (quoting Meyer, 187 N.W. at 102).
22. Id. at 401-02.
23. Id. at 402.
24. Id. at 403.
25. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403.
26. id.
27. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
28. Id. at 534-35.
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public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the
State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations.2 9
In a later case, the Court would elaborate that "[t]he duty to prepare
the child for 'additional obligations' ... must be read to include the
inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good
citizenship."'0 In a democratic republic, according to the Court, it is the
proper role of parents rather than the State to "prepare" children for
citizenship.' This understanding of children's place in a democratic polity
follows from the Justices' views about the vulnerability of children to state
coercion and the important role that parental rights play in shielding young
children from state indoctrination.3"
The doctrine of parental rights in constitutional law thus emerged in
the early twentieth century in connection with a set of assumptions about
the parents' proper role in the democratic socialization of children. It
should come as no surprise that the question of control over children's
education arose at this point in time.33 Spurred on by the changing needs of
• 34
business, the movement for universal public education was at the forefront
of social reform efforts, and by 1918 compulsory education laws were in
existence in all the states. Progressive reformers viewed restrictions on child
labor as the natural outgrowth of their belief in the importance of education
to the developmental needs of children and the long-term health of the
democratic polity. At his laboratory school at the University of Chicago, John
Dewey and his colleagues applied their ideas about child development with
the aim of instilling democratic skills and values in a greater number of
citizens, particularly immigrant children. These reformers' commitment to
educational reform was part of a broader progressive-era movement for
democracy that rested on a belief in the importance of educating children
for democratic citizenship.
5
29. Id. at 535.
30. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (quoting Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535).
31. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
32. Id. at 534-35.
33. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child
as Property, 33 WrM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1003 (1992) (examining social and political conflicts
surrounding early twentieth century education laws).
34. See ANTHONY M. PLArr, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY xx-xxii
(2d ed. 1977); Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of Progressivism, 10 REvS. Am. HIST., Dec. 1982, at 113,
118-19.
35. See JAMEs T. KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND
PROGRESisM IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT 1870-1920, at 377 (1988); ARTHUR S.
LINK & RICHARD L. MCCORMICK, PROGRESSIVISM 90 (1983).
[2006]
DEVELOPING CITIZENS
Yet parental rights bore an ambivalent relationship to the early
twentieth-century goal of educating children for democracy. On the one
hand, parental rights were seen as providing a necessary defense against the
rise of authoritarian government.36 The threat of communism from abroad
prompted fears about state indoctrination of young minds, as the opinions
supporting parental rights in Meyer and Pierce both suggest.3 7 Parental rights
defused the threat of excessive state authority, thereby fostering the
development of democratic citizens free from state control. On the other
hand, public efforts to shore up democratic values against the perceived
threat from abroad also became more urgent. State legislation excluding
aliens from working as public school teachers was passed during whatJustice
Blackmun described as World War I's "frantic and overreactive days." '8 In
April 1939, President Roosevelt presided over a national Conference on
Children in a Democracy, the aim of which was to consider "the relationship
between a successful democracy and the children who form an integral part
of that democracy."09 On the eve of World War II, securing democracy by
inculcating the ways of democratic thinking in young minds had become a
national priority.
One year later, the Supreme Court squarely entered this national
debate over the democratic education of children with a controversial and
short-lived decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis.40 Justice Frankfurter
wrote the opinion upholding the power of a Pennsylvania school board to
expel public school children for refusing to stand and salute the American
flag while reciting the Pledge of Allegiance. 4 ' The plaintiffs in this case were
a father and his two children who, as Jehovah's Witnesses, claimed that the
required ceremony violated their rights to religious freedom.42 A majority of
the Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim, with Justice Stone alone dissenting.
Frankfurter's discussion of the State's authority to "exact participation in the
flag-salute ceremony"43 is worth considering even though a majority of the
Justices would change their minds on the matter within three years.44 In
reaching his decision upholding the school board's decision to expel the
36. See Woodhouse, supra note 33, at 1091 (discussing the opinion of Justice McReynolds
in Meyers v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
37. See id. at 1078.
38. Anbach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 82 (1979) (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
39. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address by the President of the United States (Apr. 26, 1939),
in CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN IN A DEMOCRACY, PAPERS AND DISCUSSIONS AT THE INITIAL SESSION
(1939).
40. 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943).
41. Id. at591.
42. Id. at 591-92.
43. Id. at 592.
44. Id.
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Gobitis children, Frankfurter weighed the children's right to religious
freedom against the State's strong interest in fostering "national cohesion.,
45
With respect to the State's interest, Frankfurter clarified that "[w]e are
dealing with an interest inferior to none in the hierarchy of legal values."4 6
Playing upon fears aroused by the war in Europe, he declared that
"[n]jational unity is the basis of national security."4 7 For Frankfurter, nothing
less than the "the existence of an organized political society" was at stake in
the dispute over children's compelled participation in the flag-salute
48
ceremony.
How was it that children's participation in the flag-salute ceremony
ensured the continuing existence of the democratic polity? In Frankfurter's
view, "[t]he ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding tie of
cohesive sentiment. "4 9 Participation in the flag ceremony fosters a "unifying
sentiment" essential to the very existence and survival of our democracy,
"without which there can ultimately be no liberties, civil or religious."5° As
Frankfurter described it, this "cohesive sentiment" is fostered "by all those
agencies of the mind and spirit which may serve to gather up the traditions
of a people, transmit them from generation to generation, and thereby
create that continuity of a treasured common life which constitutes a
civilization." 5' A democratic society, Frankfurter explained, "may in self-
protection utilize the educational process for inculcating those almost
unconscious feelings which bind men together in a comprehending loyalty,
whatever may be their lesser differences and difficulties." 5 2 The purpose of
the compulsory flag-ceremony law, he explained, is the cultivation of this
cohesive sentiment in the hearts and minds of children at an early age, "at
those periods of development when their minds are supposedly receptive to
its assimilation., 53 He elaborated:
We are dealing here with the formative period in the development
of citizenship. Great diversity of psychological and ethical opinion
45. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 595.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 596.
49. Id.
50. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 597. The idea that democracy rests on the sentiments of citizens was
a theme echoed throughout this period in Supreme Court decisions, including several of the
Japanese internment cases. In these cases, the Court repeatedly described the "loyalty" that
binds a citizen to his country as "a matter of mind and of heart not of race." Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 107 (1943) (DouglasJ., concurring) (affirming a conviction for the
violation of a military curfew order imposed on Japanese Americans); see also Ex pane Mitsuye
Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 302 (1944) (holding that a military detention of a concededly loyal
Japanese American was unauthorized).
51. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 596.
52. Id. at 600.
53. Id. at 597.
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exists among us concerning the best way to train children for their
place in society. Because of these differences and because of
reluctance to permit a single, iron-cast system of education to be
imposed upon a nation ... even though public education is one of
our most cherished democratic institutions, the Bill of Rights bars a
state from compelling all children to attend the public schools. But
it is a very different thing for this Court to exercise censorship over
the conviction of legislatures that a particular program or exercise
will best promote in the minds of children who attend the common
54
schools an attachment to the institutions of their country.
Frankfurter's view of the vital link between the inculcation of democratic
sentiments and the survival of a democratic way of life led him to construe
the compulsory flag-ceremony law as a legitimate state interest of the highest
magnitude, outweighing the individual interests of the Jehovah's Witness
parents and children in this case.
Three years later, the Supreme Court revisited the question of the
State's power to inculcate democratic values in school children in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,55 a case nearly identical on its facts
to Gobitis. Barnette involved a challenge by Jehovah's Witnesses to a West
Virginia law requiring that public school children salute the flag. This time,
a majority of the Court firmly rejected the State's argument that democracy
requires the public inculcation of values in children in favor of the view that
democratic values are best transmitted to children through early exposure to
democratic institutions. As Justice Jackson argued for the majority, " [t]hat
they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous
protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to
strangle the free mind at its source." 56 On the question of instilling patriotic
loyalty in young children, the concurring Justices reasoned: "Love of country
must spring from willing hearts and free minds.",7 In the majority's view,
children's exposure to a democratic environment, and not direct
inculcation, is the primary route for the transmission of democratic values to
future citizens.a5 Frankfurter filed a long dissent in which he reiterated the
views that he had expressed in Gobitis. His strongly worded opinion took the
position that the Constitution requires deference to the state legislature's
54. Id. at 598-99 (citation omitted).
55. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
56. Id. at 637.
57. Id. at 644 (Black,J., concurring).
58. Id. at 631; see also Betsy Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict Between
Authority and Individual Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647, 1653 (1986) (listing Barnette
among the cases in which "the Court has noted the state's considerable interest in inculcating
democratic values and traditions").
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assessment of how best to inculcate democratic values in young children.59
As he described it, it is perfectly legitimate, indeed necessary, for the State to
promote the affirmative inculcation of particular "ideas and sentiments."
60
What these ideas and sentiments were is less clear: loyalty, a respect for
fundamental rights, and a somewhat vague "appreciation of the nation's
hopes and dreams, its sufferings and sacrifices." 6'
The Court continued the debate over inculcating democratic values in
children the following year in Prince v. Massachusetts.6' Like Barnette, this case
involved the right of Jehovah's Witness parents to raise their children in
accordance with their religious beliefs. Sarah Prince had been convicted of
violating the Massachusetts child labor laws after she allowed her niece, for
whom she was the legal guardian, to distribute religious publications on the
street at night in her company. In upholding the conviction, the Court
invoked the constitutional rights of parents: "It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose
primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state
can neither supply nor hinder."6 3 Nevertheless, "these sacred private
interests, basic in a democracy," were outweighed by "the interest of youth
itself, and of the whole community, that children be both safeguarded from
abuses and given opportunities for growth into free and independent well-
developed men and citizens."64 Citing empirical research on the effects of
child labor, the Court asserted that a "democratic society rests, for its
continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into
full maturity as citizens, with all that implies."65 In the same vein, the Court
concluded: "Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does
not follow that they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of
their children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion
when they can make that choice for themselves."66 The Prince Court
identified limits to parental authority aimed at reducing the power of
parents to foster values inconsistent with children's growth into
independent democratic citizens. In contrast to the earlier decisions in
Meyer, Pierce, and Barnette, here the Court sustained a powerful role for the
59. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 662 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("But, it is not for this Court to
make psychological judgments as to the effectiveness of a particular symbol in inculcating
concededly indispensable feelings, particularly if the state happens to see fit to utilize the
symbol that represents our heritage and our hopes.").
60. Id. at 669 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
61. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 597 (1940).
62. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
63. Id. at 166 (citing generally Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
64. Id. at 165.
65. Id. at 168.
66. Id. at 170.
[2006]
DEVELOPING CITIZENS
State in inculcating democratic values over the objection of parents and
guardians.
The opinions in Meyer, Pierce, Barnette, and Prince all relied on common-
sense assumptions about the process by which children acquire the skills and
values of democratic citizenship. Brown v. Board of Education" took a further
step in the direction of working out the role of the State in the political
socialization of children. The focus in Brown was on equal citizenship rather
than due process or religious freedom, but the same concern for
"strangl[ing] the free mind at its source"68 was evident: "To separate
[African-American children] from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status
in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
ever to be undone."69 The particular importance of Brown-beyond its
stunning assault on racial segregation-was the introduction of empirical
research on child development. The use of empirical research was not
unprecedented, as the decision in Prince shows. But Brown represents an
important step forward, albeit short-lived, in the application of
developmental research to the constitutional debate over the political
socialization of children. With this research came the possibility of moving
beyond common-sense ideas about democratic socialization to a much
deeper and more sophisticated understanding of the developmental process
by which the psychological skills of democratic citizenship are transmitted to
future generations.
B. DEFENDING FOOTNOTE ELEVEN
The reference to developmental literature in the Brown decision did not
emerge out of thin air. At the turn of the twentieth century, Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. had proclaimed the importance of the newly emerging social
sciences for law. v° In a similar vein, Roscoe Pound had been urging a
new sociological jurisprudence that affirmed the superiority of empirical
science over formal logic as an instrument of legal reasoning. Originally a
critique of late nineteenth century legal formalism, the legal realists'
interdisciplinary orientation and empirical focus soon became standard
features in legal decisionmaking and scholarship. Yet the application of
social science research to the realm of constitutional decisionmaking was
67. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
68. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
69. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
70. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Profession of the Law, in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
JUSTICE HOLMES: COMPLETE PUBLIC WRITINGS AND SELECTED JUDICIAL OPINIONS OF OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES 471, 472 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1995).
71. See generally JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL
SCIENCE (1995); Roscoe Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 GREEN BAG 607 (1907).
91 IOWA LAWREVIEW
fraught with controversy from the beginning. Much of the controversy can
72be traced to the outcry over the Brown decision.
The developmental research appeared in Brown's footnote eleven. The
footnote included a string citation to social psychology studies on the
adverse psychological effects of segregated schools on African-American
children.73 The Supreme Court referred to this research in concluding that
"[lto separate [black children] from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status
in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
ever to be undone."74 Based on this "psychological knowledge," and
supported by the "modern authorit[ies]" listed in the footnote, the Supreme
Court came to the unanimous legal conclusion that "[s] eparate educational
facilities are inherently unequal."75 As commentators have pointed out, it is
not clear that the Supreme Court actually relied on the developmental
research to reach its holding.76 Even Chief Justice Earl Warren, who
authored the decision, expressed surprise at the ensuing controversy. "'It
was only a note, after all,"' he is reported to have observed.'
7
72. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
73. The footnote reads in full:
K. B. Clark, Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality Development
(Midcentury White House Conference on Children and Youth, 1950); Witmer and
Kotinsky, Personality in the Making (1952), c. VI; Deutscher and Chein, The
Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey of Social Science Opinion,
26J.Psychol. 259 (1948); Chein, What are the Psychological Effects of Segregation
Under Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3 Int. J. Opinion and Attitude Res. 229
(1949); Brameld, Educational Costs, in Discrimination and National Welfare
(Maclver, ed., 1949), 44-48; Frazier, The Negro in the United States (1949), 674-
681. And see generally Myrdal, An American Dilemma (1944).
Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n.ll.
Footnote eleven had its origins in an Appendix to the Appellants' Brief entitled "The
Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of Desegregation-A Social Science Statement."
See P.B. KURLAND & G. CASPER, LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 43-61 (1975). The Social Science Statement was
drafted by the social scientists Kenneth Clark, Isidor Chein, and Stuart Cook with support from
the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues and was signed by thirty-two of the
country's most prominent social scientists. See generally SOCIAL SCIENTISTS FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE:
MAKING THE CASE AGAINST SEGREGATION (2001). The eighteen-page Statement concluded that
.segregation was psychologically damaging both to minority and majority group children" and
'that desegregation could proceed smoothly and without trouble if it were done quickly and
firmly." John P. Jackson, Jr., Creating a Consensus: Psychologists, the Supreme Court, and School
Desegregation, 1952-1955-Experts in the Service of Social Reform: SPSSI, Psychology, and Society, 1936-
1996, 54J. Soc. ISSUES 143 (Spring 1998).
74. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
75. Id. at 494-95.
76. See generally, e.g., Sanjay Mody, Note, Brown Footnote Eleven in Historical Context: Social
Science and the Supreme Court's Quest for Legitimacy, 54 STAN. L. REv. 793 (2002).
77. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLEJUSTICE 706 (1976).
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Chief Justice Warren's apparent bewilderment about the outcry over
footnote eleven belies the extent to which this evidence was the focus of
debate from the beginning of the lawsuits through oral argument at the
Supreme Court. Most of the litigation controversy centered on what has
come to be known as the "doll studies." At the request of Thurgood
Marshall, then a lawyer with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the lead
lawyer for the plaintiffs, the social psychologist Kenneth Clark testified at
trial in three of the four cases that were consolidated on appeal in Brown.
78
The focus of Clark's testimony was a series of studies that he and his wife,
Mamie Clark, had carried out with children aged three to seven using brown
and white dolls. In these tests, the children were asked: "'Give me the white
doll"' and "'Give me the Negro doll,"' along with "'Give me the doll you like
best,' "'Give me the doll that is the nice doll,' and "'Give me the doll that
looks bad."' 79 The majority of the African-American children tested showed
an unmistakable preference for the white doll and a rejection of the brown
doll.s ° "In this case," Thurgood Marshall argued to theJustices, "we have the
positive testimony from Dr. Clark that the humiliation that these children
have been going through is the type of injury to the minds that will be
permanent as long as they are in segregated schools."8 l The problem for
Marshall, as pointed out by opposing counsel at oral argument, was that a
majority of African-American children in both segregated and non-
segregated schools showed a clear preference for the white doll."
Perhaps for this reason, Chief Justice Warren did not rely directly on
Clark's testimony or on the amicus brief, but instead cited to a
comprehensive fact-finding report written by Clark entitled "The Effect of
Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality Development for the 1950
Midcentury White House Conference on Children and Youth. " While the
fact-finding report contained discussion of the doll studies, it also included
an extensive review of research by dozens of other prominent social
psychologists of the era supporting the proposition that segregated schools
have an adverse effect on the psychological well-being of African-American
834
children . Nonetheless, although the doll studies were only a small part of
78. Id. at 315-21.
79. Id. at 317-18.
80. ld. at 318.
81. BROWN V. BOARD: THE LANDMARK ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT 42
(Leon Friedman ed., 1969).
82. Id. at 58-59.
83. Kenneth Bancroft Clark, The Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality
Development, in FACT-FINDING REPORT FOR THE MIDCENTURY WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON
CHILDREN AND YOUTH (Draft 1950).
84. See id. at passim (citing E.L. Horowitz, Attitudes in Children, in CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
AMERICAN NEGRO 158 (Otto Klineberg ed., 1944); G.W. Allport & Bernard M. Krumer, Some
Roots of Prejudice, 22 J. PSYCHOL. 9 (1946); Robert Blake & Wayne Dennis, The Development of
Stereotypes Concerning the Negro, 38J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 525 (1943); M.E. Goodman,
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one of the authorities listed in footnote eleven, history has rendered the
studies and the footnote synonymous.
Supporters of Brown were among the strongest critics of footnote
eleven. Within months of the decision, Edmond Cahn commented on the
"danger" of what he took to be the Supreme Court's reliance on social
science research. As he described it, "I would not have the constitutional
rights of Negroes-or of other Americans-rest on any such flimsy
foundation as some of the scientific demonstrations in these records."8 5
Critics such as Cahn did not deny that the meaning of the Constitution
evolves over time; the Supreme Court's position in Brown that "[w]e must
consider public education in the light of its full development and its present
place in American life throughout the Nation" was not the problem."6
Rather, these critics raised the question whether social science research is
sufficiently rigorous to provide a basis for ascertaining the evolving meaning
of constitutional rules and whether judges in constitutional cases are
adequately equipped to evaluate the merits of social science research. The
critics' response to footnote eleven rested in part on the uniqueness of
constitutional decisionmaking. The use of social science research in drafting
legislation and interpreting statutes, ruling on the admissibility of evidence,
evaluating child custody awards, and a myriad of other occasions was not at
issue. Rather, constitutional law is understood to involve rights more
fundamental and more enduring than those guaranteed by statute or
common law. As one commentator asked, "Should the meaning of the
Constitution and Bill of Rights depend upon a sociologist's most recent
study of crowd control, or a political scientist's latest public opinion
survey?"
8 7
Evidence Concerning the Genesis of Interracial Attitudes, 48 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 624 (1946);
Marian J. Radke & Helen G. Trager, Children's Perceptions of the Social Roles of Negroes and Whites,
29 J. PSYCHOL. 3 (1950); Marian J. Radke, Helen Trager & Hadassah G. Davis, Social Perceptions
and Attitudes of Children, 40 GENETIC PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPH 327 (1949)).
85. Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 150, 157-58 (1955); see also Ronald
Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights-The Consequences of Uncertainty, 6J.L. & EDuC. 3,
6 (1977).
86. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954).
87. David M. O'Brien, Of Judicial Myths, Motivations and Justiflcations: A Postscript on Social
Science and the Law, 64JUDICATURE 285, 289 (1981); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 470
(1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("The commands of the Constitution cannot fluctuate with the
shifting tides of scientific opinion."); William E. Doyle, Can Social Science Data Be Used in Judicial
Decisionmaking?, 6J.L. & EDUC. 13, 18 (1977). Professor Cahn elaborated on this point:
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There is an underlying irony to the criticism of psychological research
as unscientific since the only apparent alternative to relying on empirical
research is to rely on what commentators refer to as "common sense."
Shortly after Brown was decided, Professor Charles Black offered a
compelling defense of the decision as a model of non-scientific, common-
sense reasoning. Black argued that social science did not play a
determinative role in Brown, and that it need not have. "That a practice, on
massive historical evidence and in common sense, has the designed and
generally apprehended effect of putting its victims at a disadvantage, is
enough for law.",8 In a footnote, Black elaborated:
The charge that [the decision in Brown] is "sociological" is either a
truism or a canard-a truism if it means that the Court, precisely
like the Plessy Court, and like innumerable other courts facing
innumerable other issues of law, had to resolve and did resolve a
question about social fact; a canard if it means that anything like
principal reliance was placed on the formally "scientific"
authorities, which are relegated to a footnote and treated as merely
89corroboratory of common sense .
Implicit in Black's defense of common-sense reasoning in Brown is a
more general critique of scientific thinking as a basis for constitutional
decisionmaking. He suggests that, because of the normative questions at
stake, constitutional fact-finding should be firmly rooted in common
understandings and historical experience rather than specialized scientific
data. Ronald Dworkin has offered a similar argument regarding the ability of
social science to contribute to the kind of "interpretive" fact-finding
necessary to normative constitutional decisionmaking. 90 For both Black and
Dworkin, the problem is not that the social sciences are insufficiently
scientific. The problem is that they are too scientific for the normative task at
hand.
In the long run, the critics of Brown's use of developmental research
have carried the day. In the area of public education, for example, the Court
It is one thing to use the current scientific findings, however ephemeral they may
be, in order to ascertain whether the legislature has acted reasonably in adopting
some scheme of social or economic regulation; deference here is shown not so
much to the findings as to the legislature. It would be quite another thing to have
our fundamental rights rise, fall, or change along with the latest fashions of
psychological literature.... What then would be the state of our constitutional
rights?
Cahn, supra note 85, at 167.
88. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 428
(1960).
89. Id. at 430 n.25.
90. See Dworkin, supra note 85, at 6.
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has hewed closely to the common-sense ideas about exposure and
inculcation expressed in the opinions ofJustices Jackson and Frankfurter in
Barnette. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,91 for
example, a majority of the Court drew on Justice Jackson's ideas about the
importance of children's exposure to democratic environments in
upholding the right of students to wear black armbands in protest against
the Vietnam War:
"'The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere
more vital than in the community of American schools.' ... The
classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to
that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a
multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of
authoritative selection.'
92
The application of the marketplace metaphor to the public school
classroom reflects the common-sense idea that children exposed to free and
open debate will be "trained" in democratic habits of mind. Similar views
about exposure were at work in Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free
School District v. Pico.3 Here the plaintiff students brought suit against the
school board challenging the removal of certain allegedly "anti-American,
anti-Christian, anti-[Semitic], and just plain filthy" books from the public
school library.94 The students claimed that the removal of the books violated
their fights under the First Amendment. In upholding the students' claim,
Justice Brennan's plurality opinion concluded that "access to ideas ...
prepares students for active and effective participation in the pluralistic,
often contentious society in which they will soon be adult members."95 For
Justice Brennan, the importance of the marketplace of ideas to children's
development is tied to their exposure to a democratic way of life that rejects
"prescribed orthodoxy."96
In other cases, the Supreme Court has stressed the importance of direct
inculcation of values in children. In Ambach v. Norwick, for example, the
Court upheld the power of the State to prohibit aliens from obtaining
91. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
92. Id. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960))).
93. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 868; see also id. at 876 ("[T]he Constitution presupposes the existence of an
informed citizenry prepared to participate in governmental affairs, and these democratic
principles obviously are constitutionally incorporated into the structure of our government.")
(Blackmun,J., concurring).
96. Id. at 871; see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(holding that school officials could not constitutionally require Jehovah's Witnesses to recite
the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools).
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positions as public school teachers.9 Describing public school teaching as "a
task 'that [goes] to the heart of representative government,' ' 98 the majority
affirmed "[t]he importance of public schools in the preparation of
individuals for participation as citizens."9 9 The Ambach Court explained how
inculcation works through a process of role modeling whereby children
identify with their teachers:
No amount of standardization of teaching materials or lesson plans
can eliminate the personal qualities a teacher brings to bear in
achieving these goals.... [A] teacher serves as a role model for his
students, exerting a subtle but important influence over their
perceptions and values. Thus, through both the presentation of
course materials and the example he sets, a teacher has an
opportunity to influence the attitudes of students toward
government, the political process, and a citizen's social
responsibilities. This influence is crucial to the continued good
health of a democracy. 1°°
Similarly, in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,0'° the Court again
described the process of inculcation in terms of role modeling:
The process of educating our youth for citizenship in public
schools is not confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics
class; schools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized
social order. Consciously or otherwise, teachers-and indeed the
older students-demonstrate the appropriate form of civil
discourse and political expression by their conduct and
deportment in and out of class. Inescapably, like parents, they are
role models." 2
The line between exposure and inculcation-so forcefully defended in
Barnette--begins to blur in these more recent cases. What at bottom
distinguishes an emphasis on inculcation versus an emphasis on exposure is
97. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
98. Id. at 75-76 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)).
99. Id. at 76. The Ambach decision suggests that the Court's inculcation model is less
protective of rights than the adaptation model, but this is not necessarily the case. As already
noted, the Brown Court utilized the inculcation model to strike down segregated schooling. In
Plyler v. Doe, the Court drew on the inculcation model in a decision that prevented the State of
New York from denying a free public education to alien children. 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982); see
also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (holding that the State cannot constitutionally
require school attendance of Amish students past eighth grade when doing so interferes with
the exercise of religious beliefs); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that the State may not require daily reading of bible
passages in public school).
100. Ambach, 441 U.S. at 78-79.
101. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
102. Id. at 683.
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one's attitude toward state authority. In the inculcation view, students
should emulate, not challenge, their teachers. In the exposure view, such an
authoritarian environment runs the risk of fostering totalitarian habits of
mind. 
0 3
The Supreme Court's ideas about exposure and inculcation raise
important and pressing questions about the role of the public school in the
democratic socialization of children. Yet the ideas as elaborated in these
cases lack sufficient empirical grounding and conceptual clarity. The Court
fails to cite any developmental literature supporting the idea that children's
exposure to a democratic environment or marketplace of ideas, particularly
at the elementary school level, fosters democratic values and skills, however
defined. We are not told exactly what democratic values are to be inculcated,
or how that process will occur. In Ambach, the Court did note that the
"perception of the public schools as inculcating fundamental values
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system have been
confirmed by the observations of social scientists."' 0 4 But as the Court then
acknowledged, these findings "generally reinforce the common-sense
judgment, and the experience of most of us, that a teacher exerts
considerable influence over the development of fundamental social attitudes
in students, including those attitudes which in the broadest sense of the
term may be viewed as political." 105 Common sense, rather than empirical
research, remains the standard for constitutional fact-finding in the realm of
children's democratic education.
This is not to say that social science research has played no role in
constitutional decisionmaking since Brown.'0 6 While the use of social science
data appears fairly well-settled in many areas, 1° 7 it is the application of
103. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969); Brief for
Appellant at 12, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 535 (1925).
104. Ambach, 441 U.S. at 77 (citing R. DAWSON & K. PREWrIr, POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION
(1969); HESS & TORNEY, supra note 6; V. KEY, PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
(1961)).
105. Id. at 79 n.9.
106. See generally JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS (4th ed. 1998). See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (affirmative
action); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 576-77 (1996) (Scalia,J., dissenting) (gender
discrimination); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 169-73 (1986) ("death qualification" of
jurors); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729 (1982) (gender discrimination);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 200-04 (1976) (gender discrimination); Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1973) (obscenity); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 250-51 (1972)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (capital punishment); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 101 & nn.48-
49 (1970) (size of the jury).
107. Mark Yudof argues that even in those cases where the Supreme Court has referenced
social science research, it is "primarily on factual matters." Mark G. Yudof, School Desegregation:
Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration, and Social Science Research in the Supreme Court, 42 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 70 (1978).
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psychological research that continues to ignite passions.10 8 Justice Scalia
bitingly remarked in a recent dissent, "interior decorating is a rock-hard
science compared to psychology practiced by amateurs," 09 and his views do
not differ greatly from those expressed in the immediate aftermath of Brown.
Yet singling out psychology as uniquely unscientific ignores the large
amount of scientific studies taking place in the fields of cognitive
psychology, neurobiology, and child development. One might reasonably
insist that the application of psychological research to constitutional law, as
in any social or natural science, involves efforts to identify the best possible
empirical findings given the available knowledge in the field. This standard
requires evaluating research methodologies, sifting through conflicting
research findings, and ascertaining scientific consensus in the field. The
effort can hardly be considered so technical as to be beyond the professional
capacity of judges accustomed, for example, to dealing with the science of
complex patent cases or the economics of large-scale antitrust suits. The
argument that psychological research equates to the latest public opinion
survey or that social science findings fluctuate with the latest fashions clearly
overstates the case. Few would argue that the social sciences exhibit the level
of scientific rigor associated with the natural sciences, although the natural
sciences-particularly the biological sciences-may not always be as exacting
as their reputation suggests."0 But it is not clear why this concern should be
a basis for excluding psychological research from consideration in
constitutional cases. While divisions among behaviorists, biological scientists,
cognitive researchers, and psychodynamic psychologists do pose distinct
challenges for this task, these divisions are grounds for entering the field
more deeply, rather than not at all.
Moreover, common-sense decisionmaking does not avoid the problems
associated with the use of psychological research, and it creates several of its
own. Obviously, common sense does not alleviate the problems of subjective
bias, contested viewpoints, or empirically untestable hypotheses."' More
important, relying on judicial common sense to guide constitutional
interpretation in this area runs the additional risk of tying constitutional law
to outmoded ways of thinking. Common-sense decisionmaking assumes that
facts are readily apparent to, or at least readily recognizable by, the general
observer. Yet, the facts about psychological life notoriously elude common-
sense understanding. One need not be an orthodox Freudian to recognize
the power that unconscious emotions and beliefs exert over conscious
thinking and decisionmaking, the role of defense mechanisms such as
108. PAUL L. ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 193 (1972).
109. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 636 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
110. See Robert K Merton, Foreword to BERNARD BARBER, SCIENCE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 16
(1952).
111. BARBER, supranote 110, at 245.
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denial, rationalization, and reaction formation in distorting one's conscious
perception of the world, or the capacity of humans to regress psychologically
at times of overwhelming stress. For over a century, psychoanalytic and
cognitive researchers have documented the ways in which human
subjectivity eludes our everyday grasp. Empirical psychology plays a vital role
in illuminating those aspects of the human experience that are opaque to
common understanding or that go against our deeply held intuitions.
Charles Black was right that the facts about segregated schools in 1954 were
obvious to everyone and needed no research data to support them. But
common sense did not dictate the same result in 1896, when Plessy v.
Ferguson affirmed the constitutional principle of separate but equal." 2 As the
debate over affirmative action now illustrates fifty years later, the social and
psychological dynamics of discrimination are not so clearly available to
common understanding."3 Indeed, contemporary psychological research
suggests that common-sense assumptions about racial discrimination may
even serve to mask more insidious forms of unconscious stereotyping and
race-based decisionmaking.114
Some Justices have taken tentative steps in recent years to incorporate
developmental research into constitutional decisionmaking. In Lee v.
Weisman,"' Justice O'Connor relied on developmental research to support
the holding that a student-led prayer at a public high school graduation
violates the Equal Protection Clause: "Research in psychology supports the
common assumption that adolescents are often susceptible to pressure from
their peers towards conformity, and that the influence is strongest in matters
of social convention." 1 6 Similarly, Justice Kennedy relied on developmental
research in Roper v. Simmons," 7 a decision that struck down the death penalty
for defendants who were under eighteen at the time they committed their
crimes."" Both of these opinions are an encouraging sign of the current
Supreme Court's willingness to look to developmental psychology in the
process of defining the place of adolescents in the constitutional polity. The
task undertaken here is to push back this inquiry even further to examine
the implications of developmental research on the caregiving environment
for very young children.
112. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
113. SeeYudof, supra note 107, at 73-74.
114. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1187-88 (1995);
Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,
39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 323 (1987).
115. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
116. Id. at 593-94 (citing developmental research on peer influence).
117. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).




A developmental perspective on citizenship throws into question two
central assumptions regarding the democratic socialization of children in
constitutional law: that the skills of reasoned thinking exclude emotions and
that schools are the primary venue for transmitting the skills of democratic
citizenship. First, developmental research challenges the common-sense
assumption that the primary psychological attribute of citizenship is a kind
of reasoned thinking that excludes emotional and other non-cognitive,
unconscious processes. The traditional assumption that children lack the
ability "to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner""9 justifies
many, if not all, of the restrictions on minors' rights, including the rights to
marry, vote, obtain medical treatment, and work. It underlies the State's
power to impose compulsory education on citizens and sets the parameters
for the State's political education of children. The unstated corollary of this
presumption is that adults naturally acquire this ability sometime before, or
perhaps magically upon, the age of majority. This corollary proposition is
one facet of a much broader and robust assumption of individual reason in
constitutional law. Absent mental incompetence or incapacity, the adult
individual is presumed to have acquired-at some point and in some
manner-the mature psychological capacities for reasoned choice. 2 '
In the sphere of individual liberties, the constitutional understandings
of privacy, free speech, free exercise of religion, equal protection, and the
rights of the accused all draw to some extent on an ideal of the rational,
intending, choosing, self-directing individual. 12' For example, the right
against self-incrimination recognized in Miranda v. Arizona rests on an ideal
of the rational, intending individual who is capable-even at the moment of
interrogation by police officers--of choosing to confess freely and
voluntarily. 2 2 In Brewer v. Williams, Justice White filed a dissent in which he
put the matter succinctly: "Men usually intend to do what they do, and there
is nothing in the record to support the proposition that respondent's
119. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
120. Recognition of the non-cognitive, irrational elements in human nature can be found
in the occasional Supreme Court opinion. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 274 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Bias both conscious and unconscious, reflecting
traditional and unexamined habits of thought, keeps up barriers that must come down if equal
opportunity and nondiscrimination are ever genuinely to become this country's law and
practice.").
121. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003) (due process); Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 650 (2002) (Establishment Clause); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 589 (1992) (free exercise); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976) (equal
protection); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (privacy); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (criminal procedure); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927)
(Brandeis,J., concurring) (free speech).
122. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
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decision to talk was anything but an exercise of his own free will." 123 In
Colorado v. Connelly, the Court held that the confession of a man suffering
from schizophrenia and experiencing command hallucinations that told
him to confess to the killing of a young girl was a voluntary confession. 2 4 As
Justice Rehnquist wrote in that case, "the Fifth Amendment privilege is not
concerned with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating
from sources other than official coercion. 1 25 The subjective mental state of
the defendant is itself irrelevant to the constitutional presumption that, in
the absence of state misconduct, confessions are the product of free and
voluntary reasoned choice.
Roe v. Wade, the centerpiece-and the Achilles heel-of modern
fundamental rights jurisprudence, also gives expression to the ideal of
116reasoned choice. The Supreme Court specifically held in cases after Roe
that a woman has no right to an abortion if she has no money to pay for one
or cannot afford time off from work to travel to an abortion provider."' It is
a right to choose an abortion, not a right to the abortion itself. 12 In an earlier
case involving the right of unmarried women to use contraceptives,
Eisenstadt v. Baird, Justice Brennan had voiced this same theme: "If the right
of privacy means anything," Brennan argued, "it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child." 129 This bedrock ideal of reasoned choice penetrates
constitutional analysis even in the area of religious freedom.1 30 The Court's
recent decision upholding the Cleveland City School District's school
voucher program held that the voucher scheme did not violate the
Establishment Clause because it promoted the "true private choice" of
parents. 3' The Court held that:
123. 430 U.S. 387, 434 (1977) (White,J, dissenting).
124. 479 U.S. 157, 169-70 (1986).
125. Id. at 170.
126. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
127. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977).
128. Justice Blackmun wrote in recognizing a woman's fundamental right to choose:
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy... [But] the
Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain
areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.... This right of
privacy... is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53 (emphasis added).
129. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (second emphasis added).
130. See Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out": Assimilation,
Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARv. L. REv. 581, 586 (1993) (arguing
that liberal concepts of reason, free choice, and individual liberty "transform []
[fundamentalist] values through exposure to competing views").
131. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 650 (2002).
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where a government aid program is neutral with respect to
religion, and provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens
who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a
result of their own genuine and independent private choice, the
program is not readily subject to challenge under the
Establishment Clause.
132
Similarly, the principles articulated in the Supreme Court's voting rights and
education cases under the Equal Protection Clause implicitly appeal to the
democratic value of individual reasoned choice. 13  More recently, the
principle of reason was at work in the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence
v. Texas, which struck down a Texas anti-sodomy statute. 134 As Justice
Kennedy described it in that case, the concept of individual liberty under
the Due Process Clause encompasses the freedom "to make certain
fundamental decisions affecting one's destiny.',
135
So it is that the fundamental, driving principle of individual reason
underlies many of the great advances in individual rights over the last
century. Likewise in the realm of democratic principles, the assumption of
reason has a central role to play. Strong theories of deliberative democracy
clearly emphasize the importance of reason to the deliberative processes of
democratic decisionmaking.1 6 Yet one need not embrace full-scale
participatory democracy to recognize the inexorable connection between
reason and democratic self-government. Any theory of interest-group
pluralism or simple majoritarian decisionmaking must take for granted that
some significant percentage of individuals vote in accordance with their own
values, beliefs, and preferences. More participatory accounts of democracy
will emphasize collective decisionmaking, but the basic assumption about
the reasoning capacity of most individual citizens remains the same. A
system of democratic self-government would exist in name only if most
individuals, or even a significant minority, were guided by irrational impulse,
emotional excess, or external coercion. A constitutional commitment to
democratic self-government carries with it a commitment to ensuring that
electoral decisions are, to the greatest extent possible, the product of
individual reasoned choice.
132. Id. at 652 (emphasis added).
133. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (education); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 562 (1964) (voting); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (education).
134. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
135. Id. at 565.
136. See generally 1 & 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991); DELIBERATIvE DEMOCRACY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Harold Hongju Koh & Ronald C. Slye eds., 1999); DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997); AMY
GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 52 (1987); STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES:
CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 269 (1990); Symposium,
The Civic Republican Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988).
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Yet the skills of reasoned thinking necessary to democratic life involve
more than rational choice or cognitive decision-making. Developmental
research challenges the prevailing behavioral assumption that reasoned
choice excludes emotional or other non-cognitive elements. A
developmental perspective reveals how, beginning in the earliest days of life
and extending across the lifespan, emotional attachments and cognitive
thinking are inextricably bound together. Intuition based on non-cognitive
factors, unconscious perceptions, or memory plays an important role in
reasoned thinking, as does the emotional skill of empathy. The capacity for
regulating the effects of emotions on cognition is also central to the process
of reasoned thinking. As explained in depth in Part III, the psychological
skills of reasoned thinking depend on the balanced integration of cognitive
and emotional processes.
A second, related constitutional assumption challenged by
developmental research is the prevailing view that schools are the primary
venue for cultivating the skills of citizenship. To the extent that political and
legal commentators consider the role of the family in the political
socialization of children, they tend to focus on the family's role in the
transmission of political values, particularly attitudes toward government,
affiliation with a political party, and expectations for group life,13 7 but they
identify schools as the place where the reasoning skills of democratic
citizenship are cultivated. What this assumption overlooks is the extent to
which the psychological qualities that are necessary for reasoned thinking
and that are developed through schooling depend upon skills first acquired
in the context of the early caregiving relationship. Schools, civic
organizations, and a wide variety of voluntary intermediate associations do
have an important role in developing the skills of reasoned thinking in
children. 13 Yet educational institutions must build upon psychological
structures and processes cultivated and established in the very earliest years.
Early family relationships play a foundational role in fostering the emotional
and cognitive mechanisms-the psychological infrastructure, if you will-
upon which a liberal democratic education can then build.
The Supreme Court has occasionally alluded, however obliquely, to the
family's affirmative role in the political socialization of children. Pierce v.
Society of Sisters139 appealed to the role of families in educating young
children to become citizens by noting that "[t]he child is not the mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
137. See HESS & TORNEY, supra note 6, at 95-96. Most commentators acknowledge that some
early training in democratic values such as respect and fairness takes place in the family, see
MACEDO, supra note 136, at 273-74; Galston, supra note 11, at 300, but how this comes about is
rarely examined with empirical rigor. For an exception, see ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 140-54.
138. See generally Symposium, Legal and Constitutional Implications of the Calls to Revive Civil
Society, 75 CH1.-KENT L. REV. 289 (2000).
139. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations."140 In Prince, too, the Court emphasized that "the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose
primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state
can neither supply nor hinder. 1 41 Wisconsin v. Yoder[4' recognized the right
of Amish parents to withdraw their children from public school after the
eighth grade. Noting that the Amish "are productive and very law-abiding
members of society," Chief Justice Burger emphasized how "the Amish
qualities of reliability, self-reliance and dedication to work" reflect the ideal
American citizen.1 43 More recently, Justice Powell relied on Yoder in Bellotti v.
Baird for the proposition that "[t]his affirmative process of teaching,
guiding, and inspiring by precept and example is essential to the growth of
young people into mature, socially responsible citizens."144 Yet the idea that
families perform an essential socializing function necessary to the life of the
polity has been dramatically overshadowed by the constitutional
commitment to freedom from state indoctrination, a freedom that appears
to rule out the idea that families play an essential unifying role in the
political socialization of children.
To be fair, Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Gobitis, discussed earlier, did
identify childrearing as one avenue for the cultivation of the "cohesive
sentiment," as Frankfurter named it, which binds an individual to the
Nation. 145 While Gobitis was quickly overruled, similar views have emerged in
recent cases on the constitutionality of gender-based naturalization laws. In
Nguyen v. INS, 14 the Supreme Court upheld federal laws that grant United
States citizenship virtually automatically at birth to children born abroad to
unmarried citizen-mothers but impose additional requirements in order for
children of unmarried citizen-fathers to obtain citizenship. 147 Writing for the
majority, Justice Kennedy described the connection between early caregiving
and adult citizenship in terms of "the real, everyday ties that provide a
connection between child and citizen parent and, in turn, the United
States... during the formative years of the child's minority." 48 In Miller v.
Albright, an earlier case considering the same federal statutes, Justice Breyer,
joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, elaborated: "The statutes focus upon
two of the most serious of human relationships, that of parent to child and
140. Id. at 535.
141. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
142. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
143. Id. at 222, 224.
144. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637 (1979) (plurality opinion).
145. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 596 (1990).
146. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
147. Id. at 59-60.
148. Id. at 65, 68.
91 IOWA LAWREVIEW
that of individual to the State. They tie each to the other, transforming both
while strengthening the bonds of loyalty that connect family with Nation." 49
When the Justices in these immigration cases recognize a connection
between childrearing and citizenship, they likely have in mind the family's
role in cultivating the "cohesive sentiment" of patriotic loyalty Justice
Frankfurter described in Gobitis."5 What these cases overlook is that family
attachments are not only one important source of patriotic loyalty but also
the source of the capacity to set appropriate limits on nationalistic excess.
The capacity for emotional self-mastery, for subordinating passions to
reason, and for bringing excessive political attachments under control
begins to develop in the early caregiving period. Understanding the
developmental roots of the skills needed to manage and integrate emotional
excesses and patriotic fever must be a central task for any democratic polity
committed to the ideal of individual reason.
III. DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON CITIZENSHIP
Although not a psychological concept per se, the capacity for reasoned
thinking represents a developmental line, or maturational sequence,
beginning in the earliest physical interactions with an emotionally
responsive caregiver and ending in a mature complex capacity to lead an
independent, autonomous, self-directed life. Many factors affect the course
of development, both innate and environmental, and it is impossible to say
with any certainty how these factors will affect any particular child's
development. Nevertheless, developmental research shows us that one of the
most important environmental factors in this developmental trajectory is the
relationship with early caregivers, in particular the relationship between an
infant and its primary caregiver in the first two or three years of life.151
Empirical research from the cognitive, neurobiological, attachment and
social psychological literature supports the view that early relationships with
significant caretakers are critical to the building up of psychic structure and
stable ego functions. 152 This research correlates with the clinical observation
149. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 478 (1998) (BreyerJ., dissenting).
150. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 596.
151. See generally PETER FONAGY ET AL., AFFECT REGULATION, MENTALIZATION, AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SELF 2 (2002); MARGARET S. MAHLER, FRED PINE & ANNI BERGMAN, THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL BIRTH OF THE HUMAN INFANT (1975); DANIEL N. STERN, THE INTERPERSONAL
WORLD OF THE INFANT: A VIEW FROM PSYCHOANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY (1st
paperback ed. 2000).
152. See Linda C. Mayes & Donald J. Cohen, Anna Freud and Developmental Psychoanalytic
Psychology, in 51 THE PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD 117, 136-37 (1996); see also PHYLLIS




that the early caregiving relationship stimulates and consolidates the
development of the most important early mental processes.153
The developmental pathway under study here encompasses at least five
early interrelated mental capacities: representational thinking, affect
regulation, self-other differentiation, imagination, and mentalization. These
early mental processes constitute interrelated, overlapping advances in the
child's psychological growth toward a mature capacity for reasoned thinking.
A direct connection between these early mental processes and the mature
capacity for reason cannot be definitively established through empirical
methods. Nevertheless, developmental psychology allows us to draw some
tentative conclusions regarding the connections between these five early
psychological functions and the more mature, complex, and consolidated
mental processes of reasoned thinking. Representational thinking, for
example, is a foundational step in the development of more advanced
symbolization and conceptual thinking essential to reasoned
decisionmaking; affect regulation constitutes a necessary precursor to
emotional maturity and self-control; self-other differentiation reflects an
early stage in the development of the capacity for autonomous, independent
thinking and awareness as a political subject; imagination is an essential
element in the development of the capacities for mature self-reflection and
authentic choice; and finally, mentalization eventually gives rise to the
capacity to see the world from another's point of view.
Section A of this Part examines the ways in which the early caregiving
relationship fosters the development of these five early mental processes.
The importance of internalization to the development of these five
foundational mental processes will be discussed, along with the relevant
clinical, cognitive, neurobiological, attachment, and social psychological
research. Section B examines the question of what constitutes a good-
enough caregiving relationship in the context of the broader familial and
social environment. This Section focuses on one, although far from the only,
serious environmental stress on the early caregiving relationship: chronic,
severe poverty. Section C explains how early modes of thinking evolve but
are never entirely replaced by higher-level psychological processes. A
developmental perspective sheds light on the threat that uncontrolled
regression on a societal scale poses to the long-term health, and even
survival, of a democratic citizenry. This Section shows how, by helping to
strengthen foundational mental processes, good-enough caregiving provides
some measure of resilience against the occasional, but inevitable, collapse of
the mature psychological process of reasoned thinking in democratic life.
153. See generally Linda C. Mayes & Donald J. Cohen, The Development of a Capacity for
Imagination in Early Childhood, in 47 THE PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD 23 (1992).
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A. INTPERAIZA TION OF THE CAREGIVING RELATIONSHIP
Internalization, or the psychological taking in of the relationship with a
primary caregiver, is a psychoanalytic concept that emphasizes the deep
connection between early affective experiences and the creation of an inner
representational world. 154 In Freud's view, the infant's attachment to a
primary caregiver develops secondarily as a means of satisfying the primary
instinctual oral needs. As early as the 1940s, however, child psychoanalysts
began to recognize the infant's biologically programmed need for
sociability. Anna Freud was among the first to posit this innate
predisposition to develop what psychoanalysts call "object relations," or
relationships with other people. Rene Spitz, one of the earliest
psychoanalytic empirical researchers, 56 established that the affective
reciprocity between the infant and primary caregiver stimulates the
development and integration of psychological structure and processes. John
Bowlby also emphasized the infant's innate need for a secure attachment to
the primary caregiver.
157
Modern research supports the view that infants are born with an innate
predisposition to develop affective relationships with caregivers.15 Infants
only a few days old, for example, prefer human faces to other stimuli and
human voices to other sounds.' 59 Even at three months, infants become
withdrawn and upset if their primary caregiver remains emotionally neutral
during an interaction.'6 At first, the newborn relates to its environment
physically, experiencing pleasure at the gratification of instinctual drives and
displeasure at their frustration, and in general, being oriented to the
sensorimotor regulation of bodily tensions. 61  The primary caregiver
responds to the infant's need for physiological homeostasis through feeding,
holding, verbalization, facial expression, and other forms of soothing and
stimulation. The beginnings of the infant-caretaker relationship reside in
the infant's early need for the external regulation of bodily tensions, but the
primary caregiver's emotional responsiveness serves a soothing or
154. HANS W. LOEWALD, Instinct Theory, Object Relations, and Psychic Structure Formation, in
PAPERS ON PSYCHOANALYSIS 207, 208-09 (1980); TYSON & TYSON, supra note 152, at 26-27;
SidneyJ. Blatt & Rebecca Smith Behrends, Internalization, Separation-Individuation, and the Nature
of Therapeutic Action, 68 INT'LJ. PSYCHOANALYSIS 279, 283 (1987); Mayes & Cohen, supra note
153, at 28.
155. See PETER FONAGY, ATTACHMENT THEORY AND PSYCHOANALYsis 3 (2001).
156. Id. at 55.
157. 1JOHN BOWLBY, ATrACHMENT AND Loss: ATTACHMENT 177-209 (1969).
158. See MAHLER ET AL., supra note 151, at 3; see also FONAGY ET AL., supra note 151, at 4;
STERN, supra note 151, at 3, 7; TYSON & TYSON, supra note 152, at 24-25.
159. See SUSAN C. VAUGHAN, THE TALKING CURE 86 (1997) (citing the research ofJerome S.
Bruner and William P. Fifer).
160. SeeTYSON & TYSON, supra note 152, at 147.
161. See id. at 32-33, 147; Mayes & Cohen, supra note 153, at 28-29.
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containing function that reduces bodily tensions.6 6 At this stage, the infant
begins to integrate basic neurophysiological capacities such as the ability to
maintain an alert state, to direct attention to selected elements in the
environment, and to make perceptual discriminations in areas such as visual
patterns or the pitch of speech.16 ' These developing neurophysiological
capacities make it possible for the infant to move beyond experiencing the
world in terms of bodily pleasure and displeasure, and to begin to process
external stimuli in an organized way.'164 As the infant learns to associate
particular facial characteristics, body parts, vocal pitch, and physical
sensations with the primary caregiver, representations of these associations
in the form of memories are created. 165 Researchers postulate that from very
early on-perhaps even from the earliest days of life-infants begin the
process of building an internal representational world from the memories
created by the integration of neurophysiological functions with the
affectively laden interactions with a primary caregiver.
66
The internalization of affective exchanges between caregiver and infant,
and the memories to which these exchanges give rise, lay the foundation for
the development of basic mental processes. 67 Representational thinking
involves the process of creating a "stable mental image of a thing in place of
the thing itself"; l68 it is the first step in the development of the mental
processes leading to more complex forms of memory, symbolization, and
conceptual thinking. When all goes well, the infant's interactions with the
primary caregiver become stored as memories of physical pleasure.
Inevitably, however, the primary caregiver disappoints the infant by failing to
• • 169
provide immediate gratification. A short absence or small delay on the
part of the primary caregiver stimulates feelings of frustration on the part of
the infant."" In these moments of frustration, the infant experiences the
absence of the gratifying caregiver. Through these repeated experiences
of gratification and frustration, the infant begins the process of creating
internal representations associated with the presence or absence of the
162. See FONAGY, supra note 155, at 56.
163. See Linda C. Mayes & Donald J. Cohen, Experiencing Self and Others: Contributions from
Studies of Autism to the Psychoanalytic Theory of Social Development, 42J. AM. PSYCHoANALYIC ASs'N
191,201 (1994).
164. See Mayes & Cohen, supra note 153, at 30 (stating that these capacities "allow the infant
to 'metabolize' the input from the social world").
165. SeeFONAGYET AL., supra note 151, at 37.
166. See id. at 40-41; Mayes & Cohen, supra note 153, at 27-28.
167. See TYSON & TYSON, supra note 152, at 93.
168. Serge Lecours & Marc-Andr6 Bouchard, Dimensions of Mentalisation: Outlining Levels of
Psychic Transformation, 78 INT'LJ. PSYCHO-ANALYSIs 855, 857 (1997) (citations omitted).
169. See FONAGY, supra note 155, at 96; Blatt & Behrends, supra note 154, at 283.
170. See Mayes & Cohen, supra note 153, at 28.
171. See id. at 29; see also Mayes & Cohen, supra note 163, at 199.
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primary caregiver. 7 2 These affectively laden representations, in turn, can be
called up by the young child during times of physical separation from the
caregiver.
7 3
Internalization of the caregiving relationship is thus a vital step in the
child's emerging capacity for representational thinking and what will
eventually lead to the more abstract processes of symbolization and
conceptual thinking necessary for reasoned thinking. Empirical research
supports psychoanalytic observations regarding these internalized
representations, often referred to in the empirical literature as prototypes,
templates, schemas, or internal working models. 7 4 Neuroscientists have
studied the biological mechanisms involved in the creation of these
prototypes.' 75 Cognitive researchers have created neural network models
that, using parallel processing, attribute the creation of representations, or
internal schemas, to the strength of the connection between neurons.
1 7 6
Attachment research has shown that securely attached children have a more
balanced view of themselves, remember positive events more accurately, and
score higher on tests of emotional understanding.
1 77
The clinical and empirical evidence showing a close association between
early caregiving and the development of internal prototypes helps to explain
why the early caregiving relationship is so important in the child's long-term
psychological development. Once these prototypes are laid down, they attain
a certain stability necessary for psychic structure and organization. An adult
whose early experience was one of severe deprivation or neglect, for
example, is more likely to perceive other people and events in
disappointing, depriving, or anxiety-provoking ways than an adult whose
• 178
early family environment was emotionally nurturing. When severe
enough, problems with the internalization of the relationship with an
emotionally responsive caregiver and the creation of positive internal
172. See Blatt & Behrends, supra note 154, at 283-84; see also TYSON & TYSON, supra note
152, at 93; Mayes & Cohen, supra note 153, at 29. Peter Fonagy and his co-authors offer a
revision of the "template" theory that sees early caregiving as essential to the development of
"mentalizing" skills allowing an individual to interpret the social environment. See FONAGY ET
AL., supra note 151, at 16-17.
173. See Blatt & Behrends, supra note 154, at 283-84; Mayes & Cohen, supra note 153, at 29.
174. SeeVAUGHAN, supra note 159, at 81.
175. Id. at 200 (citing JOAQUIN M. FUSTER, MEMORY IN THE CEREBRAL CORTEX (1995); ERIC
R. KANDEL, JAMES H. SCHWARTZ & THOMAS M. JESSELL, ESSENTIALS OF NEURAL SCIENCE AND
BEHAVIOR (1995); STEPHEN M. KOSSLYN & OLIVER KOENIG, WET MIND: THE NEW COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE (1995)).
176. See id. at 37.
177. See FONAGY, supra note 155, at 31.
178. Id. at 31-35; SidneyJ. Blatt & Golan Shahar, A Dialectic Model of Personality Development
and Psychopathology: Recent Contributions to Understanding and Treating Depression, in THEORY AND
TREATMENT OF DEPRESSION: TOWARDS INTEGRATION 137, 139-40 (J. Couveleyn, P. Luyten &
SidneyJ. Blatt eds.); Mayes & Cohen, supra note 152, at 130-33.
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prototypes can interfere with the capacity for perceiving both oneself and
'79the world in an adaptive, undistorted way.
Internalization and the creation of internal representations are also
central to the development of the capacity for affect regulation and what will
eventually become the mature capacities for emotional integration and self-
control. We have already seen how the internalization of the relationship
with a soothing, containing caregiver allows the child to use these internal
representations for the self-regulation of physiological and emotional
tensions. The internalization of the primary caregiving relationship plays a
crucial role in helping the infant to metabolize emotional distress in ways
that strengthen, rather than overwhelm, the psychological immune
system."8 Even for the very young child, affect regulation does not involve a
simple reduction in emotional energy. Affect regulation always involves
some acknowledgment of emotional arousal and, in its mature form,
integration of the emotions into higher, more conceptual and eventually
verbalized forms of thinking. An emotionally responsive caregiver, for
example, acknowledges the emotional outbursts of the young child by
providing a safe holding environment for the expression and discharge of
overwhelming feelings.'8 In the early years, a responsive caregiver mirrors
the feelings being experienced by the infant in a way that helps to organizeS182
and diminish the overwhelming affects.
Research in neurobiology and attachment theory supports the
psychoanalytic view that early caregiving is essential to the development of
affect regulation. Over the course of the first year, children develop cortical
inhibitory controls for the physiological arousal caused by normal
environmental stress. I18 Evidence from animal models suggest that high
levels of stress, such as those experienced by infants in the absence of
184
minimally sufficient caregiving, lead to lower cortisol neuromodulators.
There is support, then, for the proposition that the early caregiving
environment actually alters the infant's biological make-up, an example of
185how experience can shape the basic hardwiring of the brain. Attachment
theory also shows that insecurely attached children fail to develop the
capacity to regulate emotional arousal. Studies have shown "[h]igh levels of
negative affectivity, emotional outbursts, inattentiveness," and frustration
179. SeeFONAGYETAL., supra note 151, at 25.
180. See Mayes & Cohen, supra note 152, at 133 (discussing how traumatic events during
early childhood lead to overwhelmed psychological immune systems later in life).
181. SeeFONAGY, supra note 155, at 96-100.
182. See FONAGY ET AL., supra note 151, at 37.
183. See id. at 132.
184. See FONAGY, supra note 155, at 37; Mayes & Cohen, supra note 152, at 132 (discussing
the effect of increased arousal on central processes).
185. SeeTYSON & TYSON, supra note 152, at 93-96; Mayes & Cohen, supra note 152, at 129.
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among these children.' s 6 The internalization of the infant-caregiver
relationship provides the young child with the psychological tools that
eventually equip him to regulate his emotions. This capacity for emotional
integration is the foundation of more mature forms of emotional regulation
and self-control, including the qualities of patience, toleration, and self-
restraint.
In addition to representational thinking and affect regulation, the
internalization of a reciprocal affective relationship with an early caregiver
stimulates the differentiation of a sense of self from the external world.
Within a matrix of physiological needs and gratification of those needs, the
infant early on experiences a state of symbiotic oneness with the primary
caregiver. 18 Subjective and objective are completely merged. The infant
likely experiences this state of symbiosis with the primary caregiver as
•188 8
absolute omnipotence or absolute narcissism, 89 with immediate
gratification of bodily needs creating the illusion of omnipotent control. As
neurophysiological functions develop, the infant learns to distinguish parts
of his own body from the physical world and eventually comes to distinguish
his subjective self from external reality.' 9° Along with this growing awareness
of physical separation comes the inevitable disillusionment of omnipotence
brought about by caregiving failures.9' The infant experiences a sudden gap
between his subjective needs and external gratification. This shift from
infantile symbiosis to a mature sense of the subjective and objective worlds is
negotiated through what Winnicott calls the "transitional" area opened up
by the infant-caregiver relationship. 9 2 In this space, objects such as a beloved
blanket are neither entirely subjective nor entirely reality-based; they are real
objects endowed with a subjective meaning created by the infant and
recognized by the caregiver. The early caregiver plays a crucial role in
affirming the subjective meaning of the transitional object for the infant
while at the same time confirming its existence in the real world. Through
the creation of a transitional space, partly internalized and partly
externalized, the infant-caregiver relationship serves a vital role in the child's
186. See FONAGY, supra note 155, at 42.
187. See HANS W. LOEWALD, Ego and Reality, in PAPERS ON PSYCHOANALYSIS, supra note 154,
at 10-11; MAHLER ET AL., supra note 151, at 44; D.W. WINNICOIr, PSYCHO-ANALYTIC
EXPLORATIONS 253-54 (Clare Winnicott, Ray Shepherd & Madeleine Davis eds., Karnac Books
1989). But see STERN, supra note 151, at ch. XIII (arguing "that self/other differentiation is in
place and in process almost from the very beginning").
188. See WINNICOTr, supra note 187, at 254-55.
189. SeeLOEWALD, supra note 187, at 3, 5.
190. See Mayes & Cohen, supra note 153, at 30.
191. See Rebecca Smith Behrends & Sidney J. Blatt, Internalization and Psychological
Development Throughout the Life Cycle, 40 THE PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD 11, 20-23
(1985).
192. D.W. WIINNICOTT, Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena, in PLAYING AND
REALITY 1-25 (1971); Clare Winnicott, D. W. W: A Reflection, in WrINNICOTT, supra note 187, at 1.
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development of a stable sense of an internal subjective self in relation to the
outside world. 93
The capacity to imagine and the capacity for mentalization are
interrelated milestones in the developmental pathway leading to adult
reasoned thinking. Unlike the other mental capacities discussed here, the
capacity to imagine might not seem an obvious precursor to reasoned
thinking. To the contrary, imagination appears, at first glance at least,
antithetical to the kind of reality-based, undistorted thinking that we
associate with mature reason. But imagination turns out to be a crucial
capacity in the developmental task of achieving a separate, autonomous
sense of self.' 94 To begin with, imagination underlies the child's developing
capacity for reality testing and for acquiring the concept of mindedness:
"[t]o imagine is to recognize a difference between the subjective and
objective worlds and to appreciate that mind, mental activities, or thoughts
define a world different at least in part from sensory perception. 195
Internalization of the early caregiver relationship gives rise to the beginnings
of an imaginative inner world as the infant learns to fantasize the image of
the caregiver in his or her absence. 1 6 Having the capacity to imagine allows
the child to use mental representations in fantasy for the purpose of affect
regulation by calling up the internalized memories of a soothing
caregiver.1 97 The capacity to imagine underlies the mature ability to
empathize with other people, to recognize different perspectives, and to
take the other's point of view, all of which have a central place in mature
reasoned thinking. These basic empathic capacities are the foundation for
the later, more mature capacity to imagine alternatives to one's given values,
commitments, and life choices.
Imagination is also a critical element in mentalization-in other words,
the ability to perceive other people as having their own minds and
perspectives on the world. 19 Sometimes referred to as "theory of mind" or
"reflective functioning," mentalization "is the process by which we realize
that having a mind mediates our experience of the world."' 99 At first,
developmental researchers conjecture, the child's early theory of mind is
193. See WINNIcoTr, supra note 187, at 254 (explaining that an infant learns to perceive the
outside world by interacting with the mother).
194. See Mayes & Cohen, supra note 153, at 26.
195. Id. at 33.
196. Id. at 29.
197. Id.
198. See Mayes & Cohen, supra note 153, at 33. For literature on the development of a
theory of the mind, see generally JANET W. ASTINGTON, PAUL L. HARRIS & DAVID R. OLSON,
DEVELOPING THEORIES OF MIND (1988); FONAGY ET AL., supra note 151; HENRY M. WELLMAN,
THE CHILD'S THEORY OF MIND (1990).
199. SeeFONAGYETAL., supra note 151, at 3.
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relatively concrete.'O° The child learns that other people do not see or hear
or know the physical world in exactly the same way as he does himself.
Eventually, the child will extend this perspective beyond the sensory world to
include the realm of ideas, beliefs, and motivations.2 0' Mentalization
"enables children to 'read' other people's minds" and in doing so interpret
their behavior as meaningful and predictable. 2°  Research in attachment
theory confirms that securely attached infants do better on "theory of mind"
tests. 203 This research suggests that a sensitive, empathically attuned
caregiver with the capacity for perceiving the child as having a mind of his or
her own will foster the development of a mentalizing capacity in the child.0 4
As developmental researchers recognize, acquiring a theory of mind is a
necessary step in the developmental trajectory leading to the more mature
capacities of self-reflection, individual autonomy, and personal
responsibility.
2 5
Internalization of the primary caregiver relationship is certainly not all
there is to the development of the capacity for reason. Many other processes
clearly play a role, including innate maturation, constitution, adaptation,
206and cognitive growth. While not providing a full picture of early
development, however, empirical research supports the proposition that
internalization is a necessary and foundational factor in the development of
the mental processes leading to reasoned thinking.
B. GOOD-ENOUGH CAREGMWNG
The developmental pathway leading to reasoned thinking, it is posited
here, rests on the infant's internalization of a sufficiently responsive,
affectively attuned caregiving relationship. What is sufficient will vary,
depending upon the particular relationship. An anxious infant, for example,
will likely need a different level of caregiver responsiveness than a placid,
easily contented infant. In any case, however, all that is required is a good-
enough caregiving relationship, borrowing Donald Winnicott's terminology,
one in which the caregiver is emotionally attuned to the needs of the
200. See id. at 31.
201. See Mayes & Cohen, supra note 163, at 204.
202. FONAGY ET AL., supra note 151, at 24 (citing S. BARON-COHEN, MINDBLINDNESS: AN
ESSAY ON AUTISM AND THEORY OF MIND (1995); S. BARON-COHEN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING OTHER
MINDS: PERSPECTIVES FROM AUTISM (1993); J. Morton & V. Frith, Causal Modeling: A Structural
Approach to Developmental Psychology, in 1 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: THEORY AND METHODS
357 (D. Cicchetti & D.J. Cohen eds., 1995).
203. See FONAGY, supra note 155, at 31.
204. SeeFONAGYETAL., supra note 151, at 28.
205. See id. at 25-27.
206. See Steven Marans & Donald J. Cohen, Psychoanalytic Theories of Development, in CHILD
AND ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY: A COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK 129, 129 (Melvin Lewis ed., 1991).
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particular infant.2° 7 We certainly cannot identify with any precision the
moment at which caregiving falls below that level needed to sustain a
responsive affective relationship. Moreover, serious failures in this
relationship do not always result in long-term developmental problems, nor
are the developmental problems that do arise always irremediable. 208 Factors
that may mediate the effect of early failures in the caregiving relationship
include temperament, intelligence, the presence of other caregivers, later
corrective experiences, a strong imagination, and simple constitutional
• • 209
resilience. But overall, in the aggregate and over time, a responsive, affective
caregiving relationship can be considered a crucial stage in the
developmental line leading to the adult capacity for reasoned thinking.
Modern developmental psychology is not alarmed by the unavoidable
minor deprivations and disappointments of the average caregiving
relationship. As we have seen, some deprivations and frustrations are
expected of all caregivers and are essential for development to take place.
Developmental psychologists view minor lapses in the caregiving
relationship as fostering psychological development by stimulating the child
to adapt to the real world through the development of more integrated,
higher-order mental processes. 2" Because this process happens over the
course of countless interactions, giving rise to internal prototypes based on a
multitude of sensory impressions, even serious deprivations short of trauma
do not entail adverse developmental consequences in the vast majority of
cases. A good-enough caretaking relationship-one that results in the
creation of gratifying internal representations or prototypes-is easily
established in the average imperfect family environment. The infant's innate
capacity to adapt to the average caregiving environment and the
developmental stimulation that minor frustrations provide mean that it is
only intolerable failures in the infant-caregiver relationship-failures going
well beyond the usual frustrations and deprivations of the average
environment-that raise serious concerns about long-term developmental
effects on children.
Developmental theories that emphasize the importance of caregiving
are sometimes criticized for placing the responsibility and blame for
211society's ills on families and, more to the point, mothers. In the past,
certainly, psychoanalysts and attachment theorists did engage in such
"mother-baiting," an especially cruel practice when it came to biologically
207. See DONALD W. WINNICOTr, THE MATURATIONAL PROCESS AND THE FACILITATING
ENVIRONMENT 145 (1965).
208. See FONAGY, supra note 155, at 31-35.
209. See, e.g., Dante Cicchetti et al., Resilience in Maltreated Children: Processes Leading to
Adaptive Outcome, 5 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 629, 632-33 (1993).
210. See Blatt & Behrends, supra note 154, at 283.
211. See, e.g., Carol Sanger, Separating ftom Children, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 375, 437 (1996).
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212based disorders such as autism and schizophrenia. Modern developmental
psychology has the opportunity to avoid mother-baiting in two ways. First,
developmental psychologists do not need to insist that only mothers can
perform the emotional tasks of primary caregiving. Fathers and other
important figures in the infant's life can and increasingly do play a central
caregiving role.213 Second, modern developmental psychology can avoid
even gender-neutral caregiver-baiting by widening its perspective beyond the
214traditional infant-caregiver dyad. This shift toward a broader social
environmental perspective on the development of the infant-caregiver
relationship is the focus of the discussion that follows.
An environmental perspective opens up the possibility of viewing the
caregiving relationship as embedded in and responsive to the broader social
context, shifting the focus of analysis away from individualized causes of
caregiving failure to the dynamic interaction among individual, familial, and
societal factors. Examples of individualized causes include autism, illness,
temperament, poor parenting skills, and caregiver illness or psychological
disorder. It is certainly the case that the establishment of a good-enough
infant-caregiver relationship can be disrupted by such individualized
215factors. But individualized causes, researchers have come to recognize, do
not exist in a social vacuum. Contemporary researchers studying at-risk
children have expanded the scope of their research to include consideration
of the social environments within which the primary caregiving relationship
develops. 216 The environmental model opens up the possibility of viewing
the caregiving relationship as embedded in and responsive to the broader
social context.
Environmentalism itself is hardly a new idea. The pathbreaking work of
211218child psychoanalysts such as Anna Freud,217 Margaret Mahler,' and Donald
Winnicott 19 expanded the focus of study beyond the infant's postulated
212. See Peter Fonagy et al., Psychoanalytic Perspectives on Developmental Psychopathology, in 1
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 504, 537 (Dante Cicchetti & DonaldJ. Cohen eds., 1995).
213. Empirical research confirms that the father-infant relationship can give rise to
"meaningful social interaction" from birth. See id. at 523.
214. Arnold J. Sameroff & Barbara H. Fiese, Models of Development and Developmental Risk, in
HANDBOOK OF INFANT MENTAL HEALTH 3, 11-12 (Charles H. Zeanah, Jr. ed., 2d ed. 2000)
(describing environmental research in developmental psychology).
215. Ample empirical evidence exists suggesting a strong correlation between caregiver
mental health and impairment in the infant-caregiver relationship. See J. Lawrence Aber,
Stephanie Jones & Jennifer Cohen, The Impact of Poverty on the Mental Health and Development of
Very Young Children, in HANDBOOK OF INFANT MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 214, at 113, 119;
Sameroff & Fiese, supra note 214, at 6.
216. See, e.g., Mayes & Cohen, supra note 152, at 130-31; Vonnie C. McLoyd, Socioeconomic
Disadvantage and Child Development, 53 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 185, 195-98 (1998); Sameroff & Fiese,
supra note 214, at 3-19.
217. See generally Mayes & Cohen, supra note 152.
218. See generally MAHLER ET AL., supra note 151.
219. See generally WINNICOTr, supra note 207.
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intrapsychic experience to the relationship between caregiver and infant.
The study of children's environment also has roots in the work of the
Russian cognitive psychologist Lev Vygotsky, who argued, in contrast to Jean
Piaget, that children's cognitive development depended on learning from
adults. 2 ° In Vygotsky's view, the development of children's minds was a
collaborative process that involved the adult's targeting his or her teaching
to the child's "zone of proximal development."2 ' Both cognitive
developmental psychology and psychoanalytic developmental psychology
have long advocated the idea that the relationship between infant and
caregiver is the driving force behind early development.
The interest in children's environment has recently emerged in the
field of developmental neurobiology. Contemporary neurobiological
researchers are beginning to explore the important interrelationship of
genes and the environment. This research suggests that genetic hard-wiring
is not determinative of development, but merely probabilistic. While the
potential range of genetic expression may be biologically determined, the
actual expression of a gene will depend upon environmental conditions and
222the timing of other genetic processes. An individual's genetic endowment
for height, for example, can be affected by environmental factors such as
nutrition or illness, or by the timing of puberty.2 3 Neurobiological research
on animals has shown that the environment can also affect brain
development. When cats are deprived of light during a particular
developmental stage, for example, certain sections of their visual cortices do
not develop. 22 4 Rats raised in an environment radically deprived of sensory
stimulation have significantly thinner brain tissue than rats raised in a
normally stimulating sensory environment.22 5 Animal models suggest that
high levels of stress in humans lead to neurological changes.2 6 Although
studies on human infants are necessarily limited, researchers believe that
elevated levels of stress in the early years interfere with the development of
cortical inhibitory controls that regulate stress responses and are associated
with long-term changes in brain development. 2-7 These studies lead us to
220. See KATHLEEN STASSEN BERGER, THE DEVELOPING PERSON: THROUGH CHILDHOOD AND
ADOLESCENCE 49 (6th ed. 2003).
221. See MARY GAUVAIN, THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 35 (2001)
(emphasis omitted).
222. See Roland D. Ciaranello et al., Fundamentals of Molecular Neurobiology, in 1
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, supra note 212, at 109, 151; Mayes & Cohen, supra note
152, at 128; Sameroff & Fiese, supra note 214, at 4-5.
223. SeeMayes & Cohen, supra note 152, at 128.
224. See Ciaranello et al., supra note 222, at 151.
225. See Mayes & Cohen, supra note 152, at 132.
226. See FONAGY, supra note 155, at 37; Mayes & Cohen, supra note 152, at 132.
227. See ALISON GOPNIK, ANDREW N. MELTZOFF & PATRICIA K, KUHL, THE SCIENTIST IN THE
CRIB: WHAT EARLY LEARNING TELLS Us ABOUT THE MIND 189-97 (1999); Aber et al., supra note
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hypothesize that the human brain develops from the interaction between
the genetically coded programs for development and the environmental
modifiers of those codes.228
Research in neurobiology provides a useful paradigm for going beyond
the infant-caregiver relationship to explore the more general influence of
social factors on the quality of the early caregiving relationship. If we assume
that all human beings are born with an innate capacity for reasoned
thinking, we can posit that our early environment will determine how highly
expressed this capacity will be. Extending this metaphor, we can say that the
expression of the infant's biologically programmed capacity to make use of
the early caregiving relationship will be determined in part by
environmental factors, most profoundly caregiver responsiveness. The
capacity for caregiver responsiveness, in turn, will be affected by the broader
social environment.
Attention to children's early environment is entirely compatible with
clinical understandings of the caregiving relationship. Psychoanalytic theory
has been criticized in the past for elevating the child's intrapsychic
experience over the actual interpersonal relationships with adult figures.229
Yet an interest in the child's social environment has always been an
important part of psychoanalytic thinking. Freud's Oedipal theory, for one,
is a developmental account of the way in which young children come up
against and eventually internalize social norms as represented by parental
figures.2 30 Child psychoanalyst Anna Freud focused her observational
techniques on at-risk children, first at the Jackson Nurseries in Vienna and
then later at the Hampstead Nurseries in London. 23' Erik Erikson's
groundbreaking work, Childhood and Society,212 explores the importance of
culture to child development. Modern ego psychology generally, beginning
with Heinz Hartmann's Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation,233 is a
kind of social psychology interested in the individual's dynamic engagement
with the social world. In his elaboration of the concept of transitional
phenomena, Donald Winnicott laid the foundation for a theory of
215, at 117; Joan Kaufman & Christopher Henrich, Exposure to Violence and Early Childhood
Trauma, in HANDBOOK OF INFANT MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 214, at 195, 199.
228. See Sameroff& Fiese, supra note 214, at 4.
229. The criticism here tends to focus on Freud's abandonment of the seduction theory. See
generally JEFFREY MOUSSAIEFF MASSON, THE ASSAULT ON TRUTH: FREUD'S SUPPRESSION OF THE
SEDUCTION THEORY (1984).
230. See HANs W. LOEWALD, Internalization, Separation, Mourning, and the Superego, in PAPERS
ON PSYCHOANALYSIS, supra note 154, at 257, 268-70.
231. See Mayes & Cohen, supra note 152, at 120-21.
232. See generally ERIK ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY (1963).
233. See generally HEINZ HARTMANN, EGO PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF ADAPTATION
(David Rapaport trans., Int'l Univs. Press 1939).
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individual psychological development in relation to a social world.23 4
Moreover, the study of the effect of trauma on children's development,
particularly in the context of war or community violence, has long
characterized psychoanalytic research. "5 This is not to say that
psychoanalysis has ever generated a satisfactory account of individual
development in relation to the social universe. Rather, the point here is that,
despite its emphasis on intrapsychic meaning, psychoanalytic developmental
psychology is not incompatible with, and indeed calls for, an environmental
understanding of the dynamic developmental interaction among the
individual, familial, and social realms.
Broadening the scope of inquiry beyond the infant-caretaker
relationship to include social factors is also a central concern in the newly
emerging field of social cognition, which goes beyond the traditional model
236of information processing to consider sociocultural learning theories.
Family systems analyses and cross-cultural research, too, provide insights into
the larger social context in which the caregiving relationship resides. 23 y But
some of the most important studies on the influence of environmental
factors on caregiving come from the domain of developmental
psychopathology. The field of developmental psychopathology has begun to
take a serious look at the role of social stress factors such as poverty and
violence on the early caregiving relationship.238 This research shows that the
likelihood of failure in the caregiving relationship significantly increases
with the presence of multiple environmental stress factors. 239 Most children
exposed to one or two environmental stress factors appear to be at no
240increased risk of developmental problems. Consistent with the general
understanding of infant resiliency in the face of caregiving failures, "[i]t is
not single environmental factors that make a difference in children's lives
but the accumulation of risks in each family's life."241 The accumulated
effect of environmental stress factors on otherwise average caregivers and
their families is what takes its toll on children's development.
For children living in a high-stress environment, the primary caregiving
relationship can play a crucial role in filtering out overwhelming stimulation
234. See WINNIcOTT, supra note 192, at 1-25. An explicit concern with social context can be
found in the work of many other psychoanalysts, including Sandor Ferenczi, Harry Stack
Sullivan, Eric Fromm, and Clara Thompson. See STEVEN A. MITCHELL & MARGARET J. BLACK,
FREUD AND BEYOND: A HISTORY OF MODERN PSYCHOANALYTIC THOUGHT 60-84 (1995).
235. See Mayes & Cohen, supra note 152, at 130.
236. See GAUVAIN, supra note 221, at 27-40.
237. See id at 57.
238. See Sameroff & Fiese, supra note 214, at 5.
239. See id. at 6.
240. See id.
241. Id. at 9.
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in the environment.242 But when environmental stress becomes sufficiently
high, caregivers themselves can experience a diminished capacity to respond
243to their infants' physiological and emotional needs. Intolerable and long-
term environmental stress can adversely affect the caregiver's ability to
respond in a way that allows the infant to develop internal mechanisms for
the regulation of neurophysiological arousal.4  Insufficient responsiveness
can be caused by parents "who, because of their own difficulties with
emotion regulation, are readily overwhelmed by the infant's negative
affect. 2 45 While a vulnerability to stress is especially true for caregivers who
themselves lacked good-enough caregiving, anyone is vulnerable. The
environmental model helps us to see failure in the caregiving relationship
not in terms of bad parenting or bad parents but as a normal response to
overwhelming levels of environmental stress on psychological functioning. 46
All but the most resilient caregivers need a social environment that supports
their relationships with children. This does not mean a perfect environment,
or even necessarily a good one, but merely one good enough to sustain a
responsive infant-caregiver relationship.
Research in developmental psychopathology confirms that persistent,
severe poverty is among the most serious, widespread, and predictable risk
factors for failure in the caregiving relationship.14' Although poverty as a
248
social category can be defined in different ways and has different
meanings in different contexts, these differences in measurement do not
alter the basic facts. Under the federal government's official poverty index,
16.3% of all children lived in poverty in 2001, including 18.2% of children
under six, nearly one-fifth of all children under six in the United States.249
Study after study confirms that, despite some resilience on the part of some
children and caregivers,2 50 long-term poverty creates a high-risk environment
with serious repercussions for children's physical, cognitive, and
socioemotional development.
251
The path-breaking studies in this area were carried out on depression-
era families in the 1930s by Glen Elder. Elder studied the effect of job loss
242. SeeMcLoyd, supra note 216, at 197-98.
243. See id. at 195-97.
244. See Sameroff & Fiese, supra note 214, at 9.
245. FONAGY ETAL., supra note 151, at9.
246. See McLoyd, supra note 216, at 196.
247. SeeAberetal., supra note 215, at 118-20.
248. See Aletha C. Huston et al., Children and Poverty: Issues in Contemporary Research, 65
CHILD DEv. 275, 276-77 (1994).
249. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2001, at 3 (2002).
250. See Cicchetti et al., supra note 209, at 629.
251. See, e.g., Aber et al., supra note 215, at 113; Greg T. Duncan et al., Economic Deprivation
and Early Childhood Development, 65 CHILD DEV. 296, 297 (1994); Huston et al., supra note 248, at
277; McLoyd, supra note 216, at 190-98.
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on families during the Great Depression, and his research showed that high
levels of environmental stress significantly affected family relationships as
parents and children adapted to economic hardship.2 2 Contemporary
research confirms Elder's findings. Studies have produced strong evidence
that "poverty and economic stress elevate socioemotional problems in
children partly by increasing parents' tendency to discipline children in a
punitive and inconsistent manner and to ignore children's dependency
needs."25' For preschool and school-age children, the effects of poverty may
be felt directly, either in the form of a chaotic or distressing home
environment or in interactions with an economically impoverished
neighborhood, childcare center, school, or community.25 4 But for infants
and very young children, the external world is experienced through the
primary caregiving relationship. Poverty disrupts the early caregiving
relationship in part because of the effect that negative life events and
conditions have on adult caregivers. 2 5 Research indicates that chronic
poverty is more harmful than temporary poverty, that both poor mothers
and fathers show a decline in parenting skills, and that caregiver depression
and anger are a source of developmental failure in the caregiving
relationship.5
6
As a social risk factor for failure in the early caregiving relationship,
poverty is not unique. Other social risk factors, such as domestic violence
and substance abuse, also greatly raise the probability of caregiving failure,
at least over the short run. What is unique about poverty, however, is its
chronic, intergenerational hold on such a large, well-defined number of
families, and its frequent association with other social risk factors.2 5' Given
the widespread, intergenerational effects of poverty on the early caregiving
relationship, the implications for constitutional law are direct and serious.
Our constitutional system depends upon citizens possessing the capacity for
reasoned thinking, a capacity that in turn depends to some degree on the
early experience of a stable, responsive affective relationship. The kind of
chronic, severe poverty experienced by families living in the United States
252. See GLEN ELDER, JR., CHILDREN OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION 62-63 (1974); see also Rand
D. Conger et al., Economic Stress, Coercive Family Process, and Developmental Problems of Adolescents,
65 CHILD DEV. 541, 557 (1994) (concluding that economic pressure experienced by parents
increases parental hostility toward children); Glen H. Elder, Jr. et al., Linking Family Hardship to
Children's Lives, 56 CHILD DEV. 361, 371 (1985) (describing a study that showed that economic
hardship adversely affected the psychosocial well-being of female children).
253. McLoyd, supra note 216, at 196.
254. See Huston et al., supra note 248, at 279.
255. See Vonnie C. McLoyd & Leon Wilson, The Strain of Living Poor: Parenting, Social Support,
and Child Mental Health, in CHILDREN IN POVERTY 105, 108 (Aletha C. Huston ed., 1991).
256. See McLoyd, supra note 216, at 196; McLoyd & Wilson, supra note 255, at 108-11.
257. Poverty encompasses multiple risk factors in addition to low income such as
homelessness, neighborhood violence, substance abuse, poor parenting skills, caregiver
depression, and poor physical health. See Sameroff & Fiese, supra note 214, at 9.
91 IOWA LAWREVIEW
operates as a form of political disenfranchisement for this entire class of
children. Developmental psychology gives us a vital perspective on the life-
long barriers that social conditions like poverty put in the way of children's
future opportunity for developing the psychological skills of democratic
citizenship.
C. CAREGIVING AND SOCIETAL REGRESSION
It is tempting to conceptualize psychological development in
teleological terms, but in fact the development of mental structures and
processes combines both progressive and regressive movement.25
s
Regression to earlier modes of mental functioning is understood to be a
normal part of psychological growth and adult mental experience.
Developmental psychologists have noted that progress along developmental
lines is subject to temporary relapses to earlier modes of thinking,
particularly during times of stress. A tired child, for example, might revert to
thumb-sucking; a distressed child might fall prey to temper tantrums. As
children reach certain developmental milestones in one area, they will often
experience regression in another functional realm. 259 The psychoanalyst
Hans Loewald has described how periods of consolidation in ego
development are often preceded by "periods of relative ego
disorganization... characterized by regression." Regression in children is
also part of a normal reaction to stress, such as a young child's
developmental backslides upon the birth of a younger sibling. Psychological
development is thus broadly understood to be discontinuous, involving
periods of progression and regression, although always moving ahead in a
generally forward, linear way along developmental pathways toward more
261
complex forms of thinking.
Regression to developmentally earlier modes of thinking is not only a
feature of childhood. Regression is a universal feature of mental functioning
that reflects the continuing presence of early modes of thinking alongside
262
more mature mental processes. The presence of regressive features in
258. SeeTYSON & TYSON, supra note 152, at 18.
259. See Mayes & Cohen, supra note 152, at 122; Phyllis Tyson & Robert L. Tyson,
Development, in PSYCHOANALYSIS: THE MAJOR CONCEPTS 396 (Burness E. Moore & Bernard D.
Fine eds., 1995).
260. See HANS W. LOEWALD, On the Therapeutic Action of Psychoanalysis, in PAPERS ON
PSYCHOANALYSIS, supra note 154, at 221, 224. Loewald notes that Erik Erikson described this
process of ego regression followed by new consolidations as an identity crisis. Id.
261. See TYSON & TYSON, supra note 152, at 18-19, 29.
262. See id. at 171-72; Linda A.W. Brakel, Howard Shevrin & Karen K. Villa, The Priority of
Primary Process Categorizing: Experimental Evidence Supporting a Psychoanalytic Developmental
Hypothesis, 50J. AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC ASS'N 483, 503 (2002); Sydney E. Pulver, The Psychoanalytic
Process and Mechanisms of Therapeutic Change, in PSYCHOANALYSIS: THE MAJOR CONCEPTS, supra
note 259, at 81, 87 (citing JACOB ARLow & CHARLES BRENNER, PSYCHOANALYTIC CONCEPTIONS
AND THE STRUCTURAL THEORY 71 (1964)).
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normal adult mental functioning can take many different forms. In some
situations, regression allows one to let go of the constraints of higher-order,
logical thinking, thereby bringing an emotional richness and depth to one's
experience of the world. Romantic love, creative inspiration, and spiritual
transcendence are all common examples of adult experiences involving
some degree of controlled ego-regression. Certain modes of everyday
thinking such as fantasies, day-dreaming, or other non-cognitive,
emotionally centered mental processes exhibit strong regressive elements.
Because it brings the adult caregiver in touch with infantile modes of feeling
and thinking, early childrearing also involves a controlled measure of
regression. The belief that infantile modes of thinking evolve but are not
replaced, continuing to exist alongside more rational, complex mentalS• 263
processes, is a cornerstone of modern psychoanalytic psychology. The
kind of controlled regression that promotes adaptive ends such as art or
childrearing or therapeutic cure is referred to, in the words of Ernst Kris, as
"regression in the service of the ego. ", 64
Despite its name, modem developmental psychologists do not view
regression as a simple backward slide along the developmental pathway to
early infantile processes. This view of regression is more characteristic of
Freud, who conceived of early modes of thinking-what he called the
primary process-as located in the unconscious, unchanged by time.
265
Freud envisioned the mind as an archeological dig, with the older, more
primitive forms of primary process functioning buried beneath the more
recent, higher-order, rational secondary processes. In contrast,
psychoanalysts today do not view early modes of mental functioning as
untouched by the passage of time.2 66 Longitudinal studies of child
development support the view that all forms of mental functioning evolve
over time, including primary process functions. 26 ' The relevant modern
metaphor for the persistence of early modes of thinking no longer comes
from archeology, but from the realm of information processing theory.
Drawing on cognitive science, the coexistence of earlier and later modes of
268thinking can be likened to parallel distributed processing.
The mature capacities for artistic expression, empathy, emotional
attachment, childrearing, and mourning a loved one all call upon controlled
263. See TYSON & TYSON, supra note 152, at 31-32; Jean Schimek & Leo Goldberger,
Thought, in PSYCHOANALYSIS: THE MAJOR CONCEPTS, supra note 259, at 209, 214.
264. ERNST KRIS, PSYCHOANALYTIC EXPLORATIONS IN ART 177 (1952), quoted in TYSON &
TYSON, supra note 152, at 29; Pulver, supra note 262, at 87.
265. Sigmund Freud, The Unconscious, in 14 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE
PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 187 (James Strachey ed., 2000), quoted in TYSON &
TYSON, supra note 152, at 171.
266. See TYSON & TYSON, supra note 152, at 172.
267. See id. at 171.
268. See VAUGHAN, supra note 159, at 37; Schimek & Goldberger, supra note 263, at 214.
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mechanisms of regression. Poetry, for example, has obvious primary process
elements in its use of free associations, imagistic language, condensation,
and displacement of meaning, but these elements are utilized in the service
of the highest-order cognitive endeavors. James Joyce's Ulysses is the best-
known example of twentieth century literature that upsets the balance
between primary and secondary processes, thereby inducing generations of
scholars to attempt the painstaking task of interpreting the latent meaning
lying beneath the primary process surface.169 All mature forms of thinking
combine primary and secondary process elements to some degree. Hans
Loewald explains:
Primary and secondary process are ideal constructs. Or they may be
described as poles between which human mentation moves. I mean
this not only in the longitudinal sense of progression from
primitive and infantile to civilized and adult mental life and
regressions in the opposite direction. Mental activity appears to be
characterized by a to and fro between, and interweaving of, these
modes of mental processes, granted that often one or the other is
dominant and more manifestly guiding mentation and that the
secondary process assumes an increasingly important role on more
advanced levels of mentation . 7
An utter lack of primary process functioning-no dreams, no fantasies,
no spirituality, no romance-would be taken as a sign of psychopathology,
27 1
not to mention an indication of a greatly impoverished, emotionally wooden
inner world. Adult mental functioning optimally relies on an equilibrium
between the parallel systems of cognition and more emotional, intuitive
272forms of thinking.
Regression thus has an important place in adult mental life. But like
273
most mental processes, regression has its malignant side as well. When
uncontrolled, regression is no longer in the service of the ego but rather
fatally undermines it. We experience minor disruptions in our conscious,
rational minds with every slip of the tongue or missed appointment, every
daydream or neurotic symptom. At a more serious level, though,
uncontrolled regression poses a threat to the very integrity of the self. The
destructive effects of regression arise in response to trauma, when the
mind's ego-capacities are emotionally overwhelmed and unable to process
269. For a recent, explicitly psychoanalytic interpretation of Ulysses, see generally PAUL
SCHWABER, THE CAST OF CHARACTERS: A READING OF ULYSSES (1999).
270. See HANS W. LOEWALD, Primary Process, Secondary Process, and Language, in PAPERS ON
PSYCHOANALYSIS, supra note 154, at 178-79.
271. SeeTYSON & TYSON, supra note 152, at 170.
272. See id.
273. See Pulver, supra note 262, at 81, 87-88.
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the experience in verbal, conceptual ways. 2 74 Long-term stress and anxiety,
too, can put regressive pressure on adult modes of thinking.27 5
Developmental failures can also result in an inherent vulnerability to
uncontrolled regression in adulthood.2 76 At times of regressive crisis,
individuals can lose the capacity to think and make decisions free from the
distorting effects of anxiety, fear, or aggression. They can resort to more
primitive psychological defenses such as projective identification, splitting,
and dissociation, and they can lapse into viewing the world in black-and-
277white, good-and-evil terms. This kind of regression can happen to anyone
under conditions of personal stress or trauma.
In its extreme forms, therefore, regression signals a retreat from the
developmental milestone of adult reason. More broadly, individuals in
groups can undergo a form of collective regression when the group itself
suffers some form of crisis.278 Here, our concern is the danger posed by
disproportionate emotional reactions to overwhelming social or political
events. Collective regression, as defined here, occurs when the normal
processes of collective deliberation have broken down, usually as a result of
an event prompting fear, anxiety, or rage in the populace. Poor impulse
control, paranoia, and splitting-in which the group exhibits a tendency to
split the world into good and evil-can take place.279 A society that lacks a
strong culture of reasoned thinking, including citizens with the skills of
critical self-reflection and emotional self-mastery, will be especially
vulnerable to the collapse of mature ego defenses and the resulting
irruption of primitive fears and irrational emotions into political life. 280 The
eruption of adult regressive fears, anxieties, and aggressions can distort
274. See Sidney S. Furst, Trauma, in PSYCHOANALYSIS: THE MAJOR CONCEPTS, supra note 259,
at 306, 309-11.
275. See Dante Cicchetti & DonaldJ. Cohen, Perspectives on Developmental Psychopathology, in 1
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, supra note 212, at 3, 6.
276. See id.
277. SeeFONAGY ET AL., supra note 151, at 359-67.
278. For a recent discussion of the phenomenon of group regression, see generally Vamik
D. Volkan, September 11 and Societal Regression, 12 MIND & HUM. INTERACTION 196 (2001).
Collective Behavior has long been the subject of study by sociologists, beginning with Gustave
LeBon's classic work "The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind." See generally GUSTAVE LEBON,
THE CROWD: A STUDY OF THE POPULAR MIND (London, E. Benn 1896). For a recent exploration
of the themes of collective behavior drawing on the sociological concept of a "moral panic," see
generally Susan A. Bandes, The Lessons of Capturing the Friedmans: Moral Panic, Institutional Denial
and Due Process, in LAW, CULTURE AND THE HUMANITIES (forthcoming 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=781585.
279. See Volkan, supra note 278, at 199.
280. See Peter Gay, Liberalism and Regression, 37 PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD 523,
526 (1982) ("Precisely because liberal culture is a late acquisition, it is also the first to be
sacrificed in times of stress, just as the liberal conduct of the individual, which also is the fruit of
maturity, is the most vulnerable among his psychological achievements.").
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decisionmaking at times of political crisis and render a democratic citizenry
especially vulnerable to political suggestion and mass hysteria. 8'
Although the tendency to regress at moments of extreme stress or crisis
is a universal trait of human nature rooted in individual development, the
vulnerability to regression and the form it takes will vary given the particular
historical circumstances. War, economic depression, and the serious failure
of national leadership often define these extraordinary times. Such times are
also marked by the revival of "regressive ideologies" such as nationalism,
2812militarism, and xenophobia. Examples of regressive political crises in the
twentieth century are plentiful. McCarthyism, for one, represented the
collective regressive collapse of reasoned thinking, or the "triumph of anti-
intellectualism," as Richard Hofstadter phrased it.213 The enforcement of the
Espionage and Sedition Acts during World War I and the internment of the
Japanese during World War II were massive failures in the reasoned
284judgment of legal decision-makers and ordinary citizens. Collective fears
and anxieties can lead to impulsive, irrational, and often self-destructive
political behavior combined, at times, with a rise in public hysteria and
governmental efforts to exploit those fears by creating an "outraged
people." 2 5 President Wilson's Committee for Public Education produced
what one historian describes as "a flood of inflammatory and often
misleading pamphlets, news releases, speeches, editorials, and motion
pictures, all designed to instill a hatred of all things German."2 6 In the
aftermath of World War I, John Dewey described the regressive feelings
triggered in the populace and dangerously exploited by the government as
"the rise of the irrational."28 7 The fact that many of these twentieth century
regressive crises were rationalized through legal processes, such as the
Supreme Court's decision in Korematsu v. United States,288 or through
congressional hearings, as in the McCarthy era, does not change the fact
that fear and anxiety, rather than mature reasoned judgment, dominated
collective decisionmaking at the time. With the benefit of hindsight, we can
281. See Philip Rieff, The Origins of Freud's Political Psychology, 17 J. HIST. IDEAS 235, 242
(1956) (discussing Hippolyte Bernheim's theory of suggestion, whereby the dissemination of
ideas can sometimes commit the masses to "ferocious evils").
282. See Gay, supra note 280, at 538 (discussing the "regressive ideologies" of Christian
Science and theosophy as "provid[ing] a holiday from the strenuous demands that liberal
maturity imposed").
283. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE (1963).
284. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Civil Liberties in Wartime, 28 J. SuP. CT. HIST. 215, 223-35 (2003)
(discussing civil liberties during World Wars I and II).
285. Id. at 223.
286. Id. at 224.
287. John Dewey, The Cult of Irrationality, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 9, 1918, at 34.
288. 323 U.S. 214, 220 (1944) (justifying a criminal conviction for a violation of a military
detention order on national defense grounds).
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see that the emotions prevailing at the time were far out of proportion to
the actual threat.
2 8 9
A developmental approach explains why fostering a citizenry with the
skills of critical self-reflection and emotional self-mastery usable in times of
political crisis is central to the long-term health of the constitutional polity.
Among the most established and important modern constitutional tools for
the control of regressive decisionmaking in political life are a commitment
to the rule of law and to freedom of speech. Equally important, although
less obvious, is a constitutional culture that recognizes the fundamental
importance of early childrearing to democratic government. The propensity
of adults to uncontrolled regression in times of severe stress is at least partly
dependent on ego strength, which in turn, as we have already seen, is itself
partly dependent on the quality of the early caregiving relationship. When
families are able to provide good-enough caregiving, children ideally learn
to master the regressive compulsions, urges, and desires that can threaten to
overwhelm mature ego functions. A good-enough caregiving relationship
facilitates the development of those ego processes that bring these
progressive and regressive forces into equilibrium. Stated in its strongest
terms, the point is this: our collective capacity to manage uncontrolled
regressive forces in political life is dependent over time on a constitutional
polity committed to the social preconditions of good-enough caregiving. A
developmental perspective helps us to see public support for family
childrearing as an essential constitutional tool, along with the rule of law
and freedom of speech, to mastering the regressive impulses that threaten
our democratic way of life from inside the body politic.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL FAMILY LAW IN THE DEVELOPMENTAL TRADITION
The main contribution of a developmental perspective to constitutional
family law lies in its identification of the important federal interest in the
early caregiving relationship. In a certain sense, the developmental account
of citizenship is nothing new. An early version can be traced back to Plato's
infamous proposal for removing children from their parents at birth and
placing them with a guardian class who would oversee their proper
education into citizenship.2 9 The Supreme Court expressly rejected the
Platonic approach to childrearing in a 1923 case involving state control over
289. For a discussion of proportionality in regard to collective behavior, see Erich Goode &
Nachman Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics: Culture, Politics, and Social Construction, 20 ANN. REV. SOC.
149, 158 (1994). Arnold Hunt raises questions about the possibility of assessing proportionality
in the context of group behavior. See Arnold Hunt, "Moral Panic" and Moral Language in the
Media, 48 BRIT. J. Soc. 629, 637 (1997) ("The line between 'fear' and 'hysteria,' 'alarm' and
'panic,' is a fine one: if it is rational to be alarmed about crime, it may also, perhaps, be rational
to panic.").
290. Plato, The Republic, in COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 696 (Edith Hamilton &
Huntington Cairns eds., 1961).
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public education, noting that state-controlled childrearing would do
"violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitution."29 ' But however
outlandish, Plato's republican ideal nevertheless captures an important
insight regarding the fundamental importance of childrearing to the life of
the constitutional polity. How to translate this insight about childrearing
from an ancient republic to a modern liberal democracy is the subject of this
Part.
A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
To the extent it sheds light on our understanding of the connection
between early caregiving and adult citizenship, a developmental approach
has far-reaching implications for the field of constitutional family law. Since
the early 1960s, the primary framework for addressing issues of
constitutional family law has been deciding how and when the state may
intervene in the private sphere of family life. Adopting this privacy-centered
framework, the foundational cases in this area have addressed the power of
government to regulate the use of contraceptives by married couples;292 to
require that parents send their children to school until age sixteen; 293 to
define who may live together as a family under zoning ordinances; 294 to
terminate parental rights; 295 and to enforce grandparent visitation over the
objection of custodial parents. 296 In all these cases, the inquiry has focused
on defining the proper reach of governmental power into decisionmaking
297
regarding private family matters.
Privacy has thus been the centerpiece of constitutional thinking about
the family for decades, if not longer. The right to raise one's children free
from governmental interference is, along with free speech and religious
liberty, a "fixed star" in the constitutional firmament of negative liberties.298
Although the view that parents rather than the State provide the necessary
guidance for impressionable young children is implicit in the Supreme
Court's protection for family privacy, 29 9 this parental task is understood to
involve the cultivation of diverse private preferences, moral values, and
religious beliefs, rather than the inculcation of uniform civic skills. Indeed,
the notion of family privacy as developed by the Court is directly at odds
with the idea that families have an obligation to instill particular attitudes or
291. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923).
292. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
293. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972).
294. SeeMoore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977).
295. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972).
296. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000).
297. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1416 (2d ed. 1998).
298. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
299. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637-38 (1979) (holding that state parental consent
to abortion statute must include provision forjudicial bypass).
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ways of thinking in their children. Vague generalities about the family's
important role in socializing young children occasionally surface in Supreme
Court opinions, but modern constitutional law does not recognize a direct
connection between childrearing and the maintenance of democratic
institutions and values. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the
family's obligation to instill the moral values of good citizenship in young
children was a widely recognized duty.300 Today, however, the doctrine of
privacy has reduced the family's political role to that of passively sheltering
family members from governmentally imposed ideas about "the good life."
A serious consideration of the concept of family privacy, however,
confronts an inescapable conundrum. Our first set-of beliefs, values, and
commitments is instilled in us from birth by our families, but what justifies
those original involuntary commitments and relationships of authority? As
hard as we may try to fit the parent-child relationship into the framework of
fundamental rights, we cannot ignore the obvious fact that children, too, are
individuals and that parental authority is, as the term suggests, authoritarian.
One approach to the problem of parental authority in a democracy has been
to set some limits on acceptable parental values and behavior. As the
Supreme Court emphasized in Prince v. Massachusetts, parents are not free
"to make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full
legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves."30 ' However,
while Prince suggests that there are some limits, parental authority to initiate
children into a particular way of life cannot easily be reconciled with the
ideal of individual liberty that is privacy's jurisprudential foundation. The
right to "control [one's] destiny," as the Supreme Court recently phrased
it,' °z simply does not apply in the context of parental control over the lives of
children. At the same time, families are the primary institution in our
democratic state entrusted with the task of instilling moral values in the next
generation. The parental duty to inculcate moral values in children appears
to be directly at odds with the ideal of individual liberty that gives rise to
parental rights in the first place.
A developmental perspective allows us to see why, in the long run, the
concept of family privacy is compatible with the individual right to personal
liberty and political self-government. Parental caregiving not only involves
the inculcation of values, but it also plays a critical role in fostering the
development of the psychological skills that eventually allow the individual
to accept or reject those initial values as his or her own. In the context of
minors' abortion rights, the Supreme Court observed:
300. See, e.g., LINDA K. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC: INTELLECT AND IDEOLOGY IN
REVOLUTIONARYAMERICA 229 (1986).
301. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
302. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
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Properly understood, then, the tradition of parental authority is
not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty; rather, the
former is one of the basic presuppositions of the latter. Legal
restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental
role, may be important to the child's chances for the full growth
and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society
meaningful and rewarding.
3 0 3
Parental authority serves the long-term interests of children by fostering the
development of the skills of reasoned thinking. The early caregiving
relationship serves as a bulwark against governmental authority over
childrearing, but it is also an affirmative, facilitating force in the
development of children's capacity for personal choice and democratic
participation. Striking the proper constitutional balance between the
privacy-enhancing and citizenship-facilitating aspects of the early caregiving
relationship defines a core goal for constitutional family law in the twenty-
first century.
A developmental approach that recognizes the affirmative role of
families in the political socialization of children is entirely consistent with
the modern constitutional commitment to cultural pluralism. Apart from
family practices that pose a risk of harm to children, the only way of life
excluded by a developmental approach is one that denies children the
opportunity to develop the basic skills of independent, reasoned thinking. A
developmental approach does rule out the possibility that a commitment to
democratic citizenship is compatible with depriving children of the means
by which to choose whether to accept or reject family beliefs or practices.
The unexamined life-a life premised on faith rather than reason-is a
perfectly acceptable choice for adult citizens, but foreclosing children from
eventually making that choice for themselves is not compatible with
democratic principles or the maintenance of a democratic constitutional
•- 305
polity. A developmental perspective sets some outer limits on the extent to
which communities of faith may sustain themselves by depriving children of
the opportunity for acquiring the skills of democratic citizenship. Securing
the skills of reasoned thinking in this context does not require that parents
adopt a life of moral skepticism. At a minimum, however, it does require
that children not be entirely shielded from alternative ways of life, or
303. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 638-39.
304. On the tension between traditional family cultures and a democratic, pluralistic polity,
see generally CAROL WEISBROD, EMBLEMS OF PLURALISM: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND THE STATE
(2002); Stolzenberg, supra note 130.
305. But see WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN
THE LIBERAL STATE 254 (1991) ("As a political matter, liberal freedom entails the right to live
unexamined as well as examined lives-a right the effective exercise of which may require
parental bulwarks against the corrosive influence of modernist skepticism.").
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exposed to parenting practices that clearly violate the norms of good-
306
enough caregiving.
A developmental approach also accords with modern constitutional
principles of gender equality. In the early years of the Republic, the family's
responsibility for instilling the virtues of citizenship in young children was
307
widely acknowledged. As historians tell us, the task of cultivating moral
and civic virtue in young children during this period fell primarily to
308
mothers. The revolutionary ideal of maternal citizenship emphasized the
mother's role in instilling moral and civic virtue in her children. 309 Despite a
similar emphasis on the importance of child-rearing to the constitutional
polity, however, a developmental approach does not endorse the revival of
traditional family roles in the name of civic virtue. Indeed, a developmental
approach recognizes that fathers and other non-traditional caregivers can
and do play an equal and often primary role in children's lives. °
Developmental research also confirms the importance of multiple caregivers
to children's developmental well-being.31' There is no connection between a
developmental perspective and a gendered division of labor in the family or
311
a preference for the nuclear family over alternative lifestyles.
306. See id. at 255. See generally Stolzenberg, supra note 130 (examining the claim that mere
exposure transforms fundamental values).
307. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 8 (1985); KERBER, supra note 300, at 229.
308. See GROSSBERG, supra note 307, at 7-8; KERBER, supra note 300, at 229; BERNARD WISHY,
THE CHILD AND THE REPUBLIC: THE DAWN OF MODERN AMERICAN CHILD NURTURE 24-33 (1968).
For a discussion of modem "maternal citizenship" theory, see Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman,
Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory, 104 ETHICS 352,364-65 (1994).
309. See GROSSBERG, supra note 307, at 7-8; Linda K. Kerber, The Republican Mother and the
Woman Citizen: Contradictions and Choices in Revolutionary America, in WOMEN'S AMERICA:
REFOCUSING THE PAST 112, 117 (Linda K. Kerber & Jane Sherron De Hart eds., 2000); Minow,
supra note 8, at 819, 866-84. Poor and working-class women were of course excluded from the
ideal of the virtuous mother. See Minow, supra.
310. See generallyJoan B. Kelly & Michael E. Lamb, Using Child Development Research to Make
Appropriate Custody and Access Decisions for Young Children, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 297
(2000) (arguing that attachment to non-custodial parent is essential to child's psychological
well-being). But see generally Judith Solomon & Zeynep Biringen, Another Look at the Developmental
Research: Commentary on Kelly and Lamb's "Using Child Development Research to Make Appropriate
Custody and Access Decisions for Young Children," 39 FAM. CT. REv. 355 (2001) (arguing that there
is no solid evidence to support Kelly and Lamb's conclusion).
311. See SUSAN TIFFIN, IN WHOSE BEST INTEREST? CHILD WELFARE REFORM IN THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA 145 (1982).
312. The debate over the rights of custodial parents to relocate away from a non-custodial
parent is one situation that potentially, although not necessarily, pits the rights of custodial
parents, usually mothers, against the needs of children to maintain a caregiving relationship
with the other parent. See, e.g., Ireland v. Ireland, 717 A.2d 676, 680 (Conn. 1998); Tropea v.
Tropea, 87 N.Y.2d 727, 736 (N.Y. 1996). For debate in the developmental literature on this
issue, see generally Sanford L. Braver, Ira M. Ellman & William V. Fabricius, Relocation of
Children After Divorce and Children's Best Interests: New Evidence and Legal Considerations, 17 J. FAM.
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In addition to. challenging the traditional concept of family privacy, a
developmental approach also confronts the common-sense assumption that
fit parents always act in the best interest of their children. Some dissenting
Justices over the years have launched empirical assaults on this assumption.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 313 for example, the Supreme Court upheld the right of
Amish parents to withdraw their children from public school after the
eighth grade. The majority opinion by Chief Justice Burger accepted the
Amish claims regarding the adverse effect of compulsory school education
"during the crucial and formative adolescent period of life."31' In evaluating
the State's interest in compulsory education beyond eighth grade, the Chief
Justice concluded that there was "strong evidence that [the Amish children]
are capable of fulfilling the social and political responsibilities of
citizenship."3 1 5 In dissent, Justice Douglas challenged the presumption that
the parents were acting in the best interest of their children. One of the
children had testified at trial that she was opposed to high-school education,
but the views of the other children were unknown. He noted that "[w]hile
the parents, absent dissent, normally speak for the entire family, the
education of the child is a matter on which the child will often have decided
views."3 16 In a footnote reminiscent of footnote eleven in the Brown opinion,
Douglas cited developmental research on child decision making for the
proposition that children fourteen years old and older should have the
constitutional right "to be masters of their own destiny."
3 17
Justice Douglas is not the only Supreme Court Justice to use
developmental research to challenge the prevailing assumption that parents
always act in the best interests of their children. In Parham v. JR., a majority
of the Court voted to uphold a state statutory scheme that gave broad
discretion to parents to commit their children to a psychiatric inpatient
hospital as long as the decision was subject to review by a neutral
318factfinder. The Chief Justice specifically relied on two common-sense
presumptions:
PSYCHOL. 206 (2003); Judith Wallerstein & Tony T. Tanke, To Move or Not to Move: Psychological
and Legal Considerations in the Relocation of Children Following Divorce, 30 FAM. L.Q. 305 (1996).
313. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
314. Id. at 211.
315. Id. at 225.
316. Id. at 244. See generally Emily Buss, What Does Frieda Yoder Believe?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
53 (1999) (critiquing the majority opinion in Yoder).
317. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 245 (citing D. ELKIND, CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 75-80 (1970); A.
GESELL & F. ILG, YOUTH: THE YEARS FROM TEN TO SIXTEEN 175-82 (1956); M. GOODMAN, THE
CULTURE OF CHILDHOOD 92-94 (1970); W. KAY, MORAL DEVELOPMENT 172-83 (1968); J.
PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (1948); Kohlberg, Moral Education in the Schools: A
Developmental View, in R. MUSS, ADOLESCENT BEHAVIOR AND SOCIETY 193, 199-200 (1971)).
318. Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 606 (1979).
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The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents
possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for
judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More
important, historically it has recognized that the natural bonds of
affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their
children. 1 9
320Citing the developmental literature, Justice Brennan dissented on the
ground that "[tihe presumption that parents act in their children's best
interests, while applicable to most childrearing decisions, is not applicable in
the commitment context."021 The majority responded by conceding that,
"[a]s with so many other legal presumptions, experience and reality may
rebut what the law accepts as a starting point," but they do not override
"those pages of human experience that teach that parents generally do act
in the child's best interests.0 2 2 Despite the developmental research
introduced by the dissent, the Parham majority accepted the traditional legal
deference to parental authority over commitment decisions.
The developmental approach revises the traditional paradigm of family
privacy with the goal of developing a more balanced view of the shared
interests of families and government in the successful establishment and
maintenance of the early caregiving environment. This revision does not
mean that concerns about governmental control over childrearing are
missing altogether from a developmental perspective. To the contrary, by
emphasizing the critical importance of the early caregiving relationship to
the emotional and cognitive development of the child, this approach
provides a strong empirical basis for opposing removal of children from the
home in all but the most serious cases. What a developmental approach does
alter is the traditional all-or-nothing privacy framework, which dictates either
that the State intervene to remove the children from the home or that the
323State stay out of the family altogether. A developmental approach
recognizes both rights against state interference with the caregiving
relationship as well as an important constitutional interest in helping families
to succeed in their constitutionally defined caregiving duties.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 628 nn.7-9 (citing developmental research).
321. Id. at 632.
322. Id. at 602-03.
323. The Court observed that if the state officials had
moved too soon to take custody of the son away from the father, they would likely
have been met with charges of improperly intruding into the parent-child
relationship, charges based on the same Due Process Clause that forms the basis
for the present charge of failure to provide adequate protection.
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 203 (1989).
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The absence of a developmental perspective in constitutional family law
may be due, in part, to the fact that this perspective acknowledges some
degree of political inculcation and moral universalism-conditions that, on
their face, appear to be in tension with modern democratic values. Yet any
such concerns are misplaced. A developmental approach does not open the
door to state intervention into the lives of those families who fail to conform
to the prevailing norms of childrearing. To the contrary, a developmental
perspective rejects the idea that families have a duty to instill publicly
defined values or beliefs in children. What early caregiving provides is the
opportunity for developing the psychological capacity for reasoned thinking
that allows individuals to choose their own moral values and life goals.
Properly understood, a developmental approach promotes reasoned
thinking as resistance to state-dictated ways of life. To the extent that this
approach identifies the caregiving preconditions best suited to the
unfolding of the capacities of personal liberty and collective self-
government, it helps to secure the values of cultural pluralism and moral
toleration that are the foundation of our modern constitutional polity.
B. RIGHTS IN THE CAREGIVING RELATIONSHIP
Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection
between parent and child. They require relationships more enduring. -
Caban v. Mohammed1
24
Parental rights to the care and custody of one's children are a central
part of the Anglo-American legal tradition and the defining core of modern
fundamental rights analysis under the Due Process Clause. Yet perhaps
surprisingly, the question of who has rights to the care and custody of
children-who has standing to claim this oldest of fundamental interests-
has never been definitively settled by the Supreme Court. No better example
of the conceptual vacuum at the heart of parental rights doctrine can be
found than in Troxel v. Granville, a recent decision that produced six
• • 325
separate written opinions. The parents in Troxel challenged a Washington
statute that allowed the grandparents to seek visitation over the objection of
the legal parents. In an opinion for a plurality of the Court, Justice
O'Connor observed that "there is a presumption that fit parents act in the
best interests of their children" and that "[t]he law's concept of the family
rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity,
experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult
324. 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (StewartJ., dissenting).
325. 530 U.S. 57, 60-61 (2000).
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decisions. "026 Given the presence of a fit parent, "there will normally be no
reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family." 2 7
In contrast, the dissent in Troxel drew on a scattered set of cases
suggesting that rights to the care and custody of children may inhere in a
substantial caregiving relationship. Justice Stevens's dissent focused on "the
child's own complementary interest in preserving relationships that serve
her welfare and protection."028 He concluded that "[a] parent's rights with
respect to her child have thus never been regarded as absolute" but must be
balanced against the child's independent interest "in preserving established
familial or family-like bonds."3 29 In a passage consistent with developmental
principles, Stevens argued that parental rights are defined by "the existence
of an actual, developed relationship with a child, and are tied to the
presence or absence of some embodiment of family.3 30 The Washington
Supreme Court had also taken this position, finding the statute
unconstitutional in part because it "do[es] not require the petitioner to
establish that he or she has a substantial relationship with the child."33'
Both Justice Stevens and the Washington Supreme Court relied on
Stanley v. Illinois,12 the first in a series of "unwed father" cases decided by the
Supreme Court. Stanley held that "[t]he private interest here, that of a man
in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and,
absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection. 333 Given that the
Stanley Court held that an actual caregiving relationship between a biological
parent and his children gives rise to a protected interest under the Due
Process Clause, it is not surprising that Stevens and the Washington
Supreme Court relied on the case. Despite the references to caregiving,
however, Stanley did not signal the beginning of constitutional protection for
caregiving rights. To the contrary, in the unwed father cases following
Stanley, the presence of a quasi-marital relationship with the mother, rather
than a significant caregiving relationship with the child, seemed the
determinative factor. The outcome in these cases alone is suggestive. Only
one of these unwed fathers prevailed, and he was the only one to have lived
in a quasi-marital relationship with the mother and child for a significant
period of time.33 4
326. Id. at 68 (quoting Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)).
327. Id.
328. Id. at 88.
329. Id.
330. Troxe, 530 U.S. at 88.
331. In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 31 (Wash. 1998) (emphasis added).
332. 405 U.S. 645, 646 (1972).
333. Id. at 651.
334. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 382 (1979). See generally Lehr v. Robertson, 463
U.S. 248 (1983) (denying an unwed father the right to veto his child's adoption); Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (same).
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The most recent unwed father case, Michael H. v. Gerald D.,335 confirms
the view that a substantial caregiving relationship, standing alone, does not
give rise to a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause.
Writing for the plurality, Justice Scalia argued that Stanley and its progeny
confer constitutional protection only on those parent-child relationships
that belong to a traditional cohabitating relationship. As he explained,
"[t]he family unit accorded traditional respect in our society, which we have
referred to as the 'unitary family,' is typified, of course, by the marital family,
but also includes the household of unmarried parents and their children." 36
The biological father in this case was not only an unwed father; he was also,
injustice Scalia's words, an "adulterous natural father., 3 7 Where the mother
was married to another man, Scalia asserted, a biological father-as an
adulterous outsider to the marital family-had no constitutionally protected
interest in a relationship with his child even if, as was the case here, the
father had lived with the mother and child as a family for some period of
time.
The most important Supreme Court decision in support of caregiving
rights is Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform. 3 s This
case involved a challenge brought by foster parents to the state procedures
for removal of children from their foster homes. The foster parents argued
that the psychological relationship that arises between the foster parents and
the child after a year of living together gives rise to a constitutionally
protected interest on the part of the foster parents toward the child.339
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan agreed that "biological relations
are not the exclusive determination of the existence of a family."3 40 While he
concluded that "the limited recognition accorded to the foster family by the
New York statutes and the contracts executed by the foster parents argue [s]
against any but the most limited constitutional 'liberty' in the foster
family," 41 he nevertheless acknowledged the value of caregiving:
Thus the importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals
involved and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments
that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role
it plays in "promot[ing] a way of life" through the instruction of
children ... as well as from the fact of blood relationship.
3 42
335. 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989).
336. Id. at 123 n.3.
337. Id.
338. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
339. Id. at 817.
340. Id. at 843.
341. Id. at 846.
342. Id. at 844.
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Had the emotional ties that arise from the caregiving relationship developed
outside the foster care framework, the Court suggests here, a protected
liberty interest might have existed. Yet despite this dictum, no Supreme
Court case has gone so far as to recognize rights in a caregiving relationship
in the absence of biological or legal ties.
A developmental approach begins where the decision in Smith leaves
off. In the developmental view, an individual's right to the care and custody
of a child derives from the foundational constitutional commitment to
ensuring that children have the opportunity to acquire the skills necessary
for full citizenship under our Constitution. The most important factor in the
developmental process leading to the adult capacity for reasoned thinking is
the successful establishment and maintenance of a good-enough caregiving
relationship. Unlike the traditional parental rights doctrine, a
developmental approach does not define the class of caregivers by reference
to biology, marriage, gender, or legal ties, but by reference to the concept of
good-enough caregiving, where good-enough caregiving is defined in terms
of a reciprocal affective bond necessary to the child's healthy psychological
development.
Concerns about the unrestrained exercise of governmental power over
childrearing are taken into account by a developmental approach. The
Supreme Court has been especially clear and direct about its view that the
State has no power to remove a child from otherwise fit parents on the
ground that it would be in the best interests of the child to do so. Neither
state law nor federal law "authorize [s] unrelated persons to retain custody of
a child [whose natural parents have not been found to be unfit] simply
because they may be better able to provide for her future and education.
Yet a doctrine of caregiving rights does not open up the sphere of parent-
child relations to any greater state control. As we have seen, parental rights
have never been defined solely in terms of biology; the parameters of this
right have always been set by reference to tradition and shared values. A
doctrine of caregiving rights rooted in empirical developmental psychology
is arguably less subjective than the non-empirical accounts of the importance
of the nuclear family that currently inform and direct modern privacy law.
Moreover, nothing in the concept of caregiving rights would confer the kind
of broad discretionary authority on state authorities associated with the best-
interests-of-the-child standard in custody determinations. A standard that
turns on the existence of a substantial caregiving relationship focuses the
legal analysis on the elements of good-enough caregiving-a standard that
approximates more closely to the standard of parental fitness in state abuse
and neglect laws than to the open-ended best-interest-of-the-child standard
in state child custody laws.
343. DeBoer v. DeBoer, 509 U.S. 1301, 1301 (1993) (Stevens, CircuitJustice 1993).
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Because it is tied to a human activity rather than biology or legal status,
the class of persons possessing constitutional caregiving rights may vary
according to time and circumstances. At birth, the caregiving relationship is
yet to be established, although this does not mean that states have
unrestrained latitude in assigning childrearing rights under the Due Process
Clause. Due process principles clearly set constraints on the State's power to
appropriate the process of childrearing by assigning caregiving rights
arbitrarily. In most situations, the biological mother of a newborn will be
entitled to caregiving rights because she has carried the child during nine
months of pregnancy and because no other individual, other than the
biological father, plausibly has a stronger claim. In some cases, however,
things may not be so simple. A prospective adoptive parent may claim a right
to the newborn. In situations involving gestational surrogacy, a contractual
mother and a gestational mother may both raise claims to the infant. In such
circumstances, a developmental approach focused on good-enough
caregiving might allow states the discretion to allocate caregiving rights to
either mother, or to both.
Biological fathers face a greater degree of uncertainty with respect to
newborns, particularly where the father has no ongoing relationship with
the mother. As with biological mothers, most biological fathers will be
awarded caregiving rights at birth based on a prenatal commitment to a
caregiving relationship with the child and on the fact that no other
individual, apart from the mother, plausibly has a stronger claim. In
situations where this is not true-if, for example, a stepparent or other
individual has expressed a serious commitment to the upbringing of the
child-then the State might have greater discretion in allocating caregiving
rights. Infant caregiving rights are not limited to one or two adults, nor are
caregivers required to be of different genders. In practice, of course, the set
of individuals with the strongest interest in infant caregiving is likely to be
the biological mother and father. But a caregiver for constitutional purposes
is defined solely by an actual or inchoate caregiving relationship with the
child regardless of biological, gender, or legal ties.
For young children, different considerations may come into play.
Biological parents may be given presumptive caregiving rights, but this
presumption must be open to rebuttal by individuals alleging a substantial
caregiving relationship. In most cases, this figure will be someone with
whom the child lives, such as a foster parent, a stepparent, an older sibling,
or a grandparent, although development of this tie can also occur in
institutional settings. 44 A standard based on good-enough caregiving would
expand the class of persons with standing to raise a claim to the care and
custody of children and thus would provoke some contested custody battles
344. See In re Guardianship of Phillip B., 139 Cal. App. 3d 407, 420 (1983) (awarding
guardianship of a disabled minor to a volunteer couple at the child's institutional facility).
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that would not arise under the current parental-rights doctrine. A
constitutional doctrine of caregiving rights does not ignore concerns about
administrative costs, but it also acknowledges the overriding developmental
importance to children of maintaining established caregiving relationships.
In any event, securing these caregiving rights should not significantly add to
the administrative burden on state governments. Although states would be
prevented from utilizing conclusive presumptions based on biology, gender,
or legal ties, federal law already mandates hearings before children can be
removed from the custody of their parents. Indeed, the current parental
rights doctrine actually puts obstacles in the way of states committed to
providing the resources for individualized hearings on visitation and custody
by third parties, as the Supreme Court's recent decision in Troxel illustrates.
It is possible that a caregiving standard will raise the costs associated
with the litigation of claims involving rights in the caregiver-child
relationship. Establishing the existence of a substantial caregiving
relationship might lead, in some cases, to a battle of the experts. But a
developmental approach that emphasizes good-enough caregiving need not
require the introduction of expert testimony on the factual question of
whether such a relationship exists in the particular case. Over time, courts
can develop a set of factors to be taken into account in assessing the strength
of the caregiver-child bond and the importance of the relationship to the
child's developmental well-being. While the standard itself rejects prevailing
norms about the primacy of the biological parent-child relationship and the
exclusivity of the maternal bond, the determination of the presence or
absence of a substantial caregiving relationship in the particular case will not
require a significantly greater allocation of resources than most existing
custody disputes centered on the best-interests-of-the-child inquiry.
Reformulating the due process right in terms of caregiving rather than
parenthood would alter the analysis, if perhaps not the outcome, in TroxeL
In contrast to traditional parental rights doctrine,345 a developmental
approach sets no strict limit on the number of individuals who may hold a
constitutionally protected caregiving relationship with a single child.
Ordinarily, of course, children develop significant, stable, long-term affective
relationships with only one or two adult figures in their lives. But in some
situations, there may be more. At a minimum, a developmental approach
would require a factual showing regarding the existence of a primary third-
party caregiving bond before caregiving rights can be denied. Had the
grandparents in Troxel been afforded such an opportunity, it is unclear
based on the record in the case whether they would have succeeded in
establishing the existence of a caregiving relationship sufficiently important
in the life of the Troxel children to merit constitutional protection. It is
345. Cf Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 125 (1989) (asserting the importance of the
traditional family unit for fundamental rights analysis).
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possible that a court would have found that the paternal grandparents in
this case occupied an important but not essential developmental role in the
lives of their grandchildren. On the other hand, given their father's suicide,
it is possible that the Court would have concluded that maintaining a tie to
the paternal grandparents was necessary in the circumstances of this case.
The children in Troxe 46 were also beyond the early caregiving years, and the
Court could conceivably have taken into account the children's wishes. In
Michael H. v. Gerald D.,347 in contrast, a developmental approach certainly
might have made a difference to the outcome. Despite the unusual factual
circumstances of the case, the natural father in Michael H. had what appears
from the record to have been an established caregiving relationship with his
daughter. 48
The concept of caregiving rights has some affinities to the psychological
parent theory proposed by Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit
in a trilogy of books,349 of which the first installment, Beyond the Best Interests
of the Child, was published in 1973.350 The psychological parent theory
reflects many of the same developmental considerations that inform the
notion of caregiving rights here. Yet Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit insist that
exclusive rights should be given to a primary psychological parent to control
the upbringing of the child, including the right to deny visitation to the non-
custodial parent or third parties. The emphasis on exclusive custodial rights
reveals the extent to which the authors view conflict in the family as the
primary detriment to the child's long-term psychological health. The
detrimental developmental effects of conflict on children, however, must be
weighed against the harm caused by the absence or loss of a significant
caregiving figure in the child's life. The issue raises a factual question
regarding the circumstances surrounding the caregiving relationships of the
particular child. At the least, an individual who is specially situated with
respect to a child, whether a grandparent, a non-custodial biological parent,
or a prospective adoptive parent, should have the opportunity to show that
the caregiving relationship is of significant importance to the child's
psychological development.
346. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
347. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
348. Id. at 113-14; see also id. at 143 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Michael H. is almost
certainly Victoria D.'s natural father, has lived with her as her father, has contributed to her
support, and has from the beginning sought to strengthen and maintain his relationship with
her.").
349. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD (1979); JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973); JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT SOLNIT, IN THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1986).




One of the important aims of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's
psychological parent theory is to reduce the detrimental effects of repeated
custody litigation on children's psychological well-being. In their view, such
litigation undermines children's sense of a secure attachment to their
primary psychological parent as well as raising the amount of conflict among
adults to whom the child is exposed. These detrimental effects, in the
authors' view, are not outweighed by the benefits ot maintaining contact
with a non-custodial caregiver or the risk of a wrong determination of the
question of physical custody. It is arguable, however, that the Goldstein,
Freud, and Solnit approach-never fully accepted by the courts-would
simply increase litigation over custody at the initial stage. If parents are
informed that custody brings with it the power to exclude non-custodial
parents from a relationship with the child, it is sensible to assume that more
parents would seek custody. Steps can be taken to protect children from the
adverse consequences of litigation, including shortening the time it takes for
a court to reach its decision. Given the competing considerations and the
fact that no outcome in these cases can be viewed as ideal, a developmental
approach that recognizes the importance of children maintaining ties to one
or more significant caregivers serves the basic constitutional goal of
furthering children's psychological growth into mature, well-functioning
citizens.
C. POLITICAL SOCIALIZA TION AND THE SAFEGUARDS OF FEDERALISM
In Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, the Supreme Court held
that a non-custodial father did not have standing to challenge the
constitutionality of a school district policy requiring daily recitation of the
Pledge of Allegiance in his daughter's kindergarten classroom.3 5' Whether
his daughter's exposure to the Pledge of Allegiance at school constituted a
legally cognizable injury for standing purposes, in the Court's view, turned
on Mr. Newdow's custody rights under state law. The Court concluded that
because Mr. Newdow's custody rights were governed by state law, he lacked
standing to bring this suit in federal court.3 5 2 The Court did not hold that
Mr. Newdow failed to meet the case or controversy requirements of Article
III, which require that a plaintiff "show that the conduct of which he
complains has caused him to suffer an 'injury in fact' that a favorable
judgment will redress."3 53 Instead, the Court held that judicially created
prudential limits on standing prevented Mr. Newdow from bringing his
claim. The prudential limit in this case was related to what the Court
351. 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2312 (2004).
352. Id.
353. Id. at 2308.
354. d. at 2312.
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described as federal courts' customary refusal to entertain cases where "hard
questions of domestic relations are sure to affect the outcome.'
355
The jurisdictional holding in Newdow exemplifies the Supreme Court's
long-standing view that "[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of
husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and
not to the laws of the United States."3 56 The idea that the sphere of family
relations falls within a core domain of state sovereignty commands near-
unanimous support on a Supreme Court otherwise deeply divided over the
doctrine of federalism. 57 Yet the principle of state sovereignty over family
relations is, as Justice Stevens candidly acknowledged recently, "somewhat
arbitrary."' 58 To the extent that the principle rests on the idea that matters
concerning the family are uniquely distant from national interests, the
principle is patently misguided. Although it is true that most family law
issues arise in state courts under state law, the federal government has shown
a strong, identifiable interest in certain family matters for well over a
century, if not longer.' 59 The federal Defense of Marriage Act 60 is only the
most recent in a long history of important federal laws regulating family
relationships. It is simply not tenable as a matter of historical fact or
contemporary practice to conclude that the federal government has no
legitimate interest in the structure or quality of family life.36'
A developmental approach is consistent with the views of progressive
and feminist critics who argue that the family is and should be a subject of
national concern. These scholars point out that federal policy on the family
362has existed in some form or another for a very long time. " They also
identify the ways in which the structure of family life is deeply connected to
the economic and political spheres.363 Much of this scholarship supports
national legislation on the family to correct for inequalities in the economic
and political spheres, particularly laws on domestic violence, child support,
355. Id. See generally Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction and the
Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1682, 1696-1700 (1991).
356. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2309 (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890)).
357. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564-65 (1995); see also id. at 624 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
358. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 90 n.10 (2000).
359. See generally SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION (2002).
360. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).
361. The presence of a strong federal interest does not rule out principled arguments in
favor of state sovereignty in certain areas of family law. See Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and
Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787 (1995).
362. See generally NANCY F. CoTr, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION
(2003); Naomi Cahn, Family Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L. REv. 1073, 1101
(1994);Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297 (1998).
363. See, e.g., OKIN, supra note 9, at 3-24; WrALZER, supra note 9, at 227-42.
[2006]
DEVELOPING CITIZENS
and family leave policies." But this scholarship tends to focus on the
citizenship rights of women in the family. A developmental view, in contrast,
draws out the strong national interest in the role of caregivers with respect
to cultivating the citizenship rights of children. In most circumstances,
admittedly, the interests of caregivers and children in the family will be
nearly identical. A developmental perspective that focuses on children's
caregiving relationships will in most cases strengthen parental rights against
state interference. But in some situations, as discussed earlier, children's
independent interest in becoming citizens may run up against the interests
of their custodial parents.
A developmental perspective alters the debate over the relationship of
the family to the federal government in three important respects. First, a
developmental approach draws attention to the fact that constitutional law
currently lacks a robust conception of the social preconditions to national
citizenship. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[a]ll persons born
or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside," and
that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." 365 The Citizenship
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, aimed at overruling Dred Scott v.
Sanford 66 and ensuring the rights of newly freed slaves, 61 were drastically
narrowed by the Supreme Court's 1872 decision in the Slaughter-House Cases,
which limited the definition of "privileges or immunities" to those interests
"which owe their existence to the Federal government, its National
character, its Constitution, or its laws."3 68 The Slaughter-House Court declined,
in other words, to interpret the Privileges or Immunities Clause as
establishing a concept of national citizenship beyond the set of federal rights
already expressly guaranteed in the Constitution.
The closest the Supreme Court has come to recognizing that the
Constitution sets some minimum guarantee to the social preconditions of
democratic citizenship is in the area of public education. While the Supreme
Court has not expressly held that the Constitution establishes a fundamental
right to education at any level of government, the Court has subjected state
laws that discriminate in educational opportunities to heightened scrutiny
364. See Sally F. Goldfarb, The Supreme Court, the Violence Against Women Act, and the Use and
Abuse of Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 63 (2002); Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The
Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 948, 1022-45
(2002); Joan C. Williams, Hibbs as a Federalism Case; Hibbs as a Maternal Wall Case, 73 U. CIN. L.
REV. 365, 366-67 (2004).
365. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
366. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
367. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities Revival
Portend the Future-Or Reveal the Structure of the Present ?, 113 HARV. L. REV. 110, 126-27 (1999).
368. 83 U.S. 36, 79 (1872).
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under the Equal Protection Clause, sometimes explicitly on the theory that
they interfere with the political socialization of children. Brown v. Board of
Education, while primarily a racial discrimination case, emphasized the
importance of education to democratic citizenship. In Plyler v. Doe, too,
the Supreme Court held that a state may not discriminate against illegal
alien children because "some degree of education is necessary to prepare
citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political
system." 370 Building on these cases, a developmental approach recognizes
that children have a fundamental, albeit unenumerated, right to the familial
preconditions that ensure equal citizenship, a right derived from the Equal
Protection and Citizenship Clauses as well as more generally from the
democratic structure of the Constitution. Justice Blackmun made this
observation in Board of Education v. Pico, where he argued: "[T]he
Constitution presupposes the existence of an informed citizenry prepared to
participate in governmental affairs, and these democratic principles
obviously are constitutionally incorporated into the structure of our
government."071 This unenumerated right of the youngest members of the
polity to equal citizenship should be understood to include the right of
impoverished families to basic support in their task of good-enough
caregiving. Child welfare and family laws and policies must not violate this
fundamental constitutional guarantee of equal citizenship.
Second, the federal interest in fostering the familial preconditions to
citizenship gives rise to broad congressional power to ensure the basic
childrearing needs of families. Given Congress's already broad powers under
the Commerce Clause, this expansion will not make a practical difference in
most areas where Congress regulates family activity. But it would make a
difference in cases where the longstanding principle of federal non-
intervention in family law determines the outcome. In Thompson v.
Thompson, for example, the Supreme Court held that the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act did not create a private cause of action to resolve
an interstate custody dispute because "[i]nstructing the federal courts to
play Solomon where two state courts have issued conflicting custody orders
would entangle them in traditional state-law questions that they have little
expertise to resolve."
72
Similarly, a developmental perspective on federal power over families
would change the outcome in the Newdow case. From a developmental
perspective, the Supreme Court need not have deferred to state law on the
369. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
370. 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972)).
371. 457 U.S. 853, 876 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
372. 484 U.S. 174, 186 (1988).
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question of Mr. Newdow's custody rights. While state law governs most
child custody decisions, the power to determine the primary rights and
obligations of custodial parents under state law need not be binding in a
case raising a substantial federal constitutional claim. Deference to state
family laws should not trump well-established doctrines on federal
protection of state-created interests. The Supreme Court has made clear, for
example, that state law determinations of what constitutes a contract for
purposes of the Contract Clause are subject to review by the Supreme Court
on appeal. The same is true for liberty and property interests under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Just Compensation
Clause of the Fifth Amendment."74 We know this to be true in the custody
context as well because, were a state court to confer child custody rights on
an unrelated third party and he or she then proceeded to bring suit on the
child's behalf for a constitutional violation, the Supreme Court would likely
find that the state's definition of a custodial interest was overly broad for
federal standing purposes. Whether we understand this federal review as
simply setting limits on state law definitions of a custodial interest, or
whether we see this review as establishing a federal common law of custody
rights under the Constitution, does not make a significant practical
difference. Either way, state law should not be solely determinative of an
issue that is antecedent to the review of a substantial federal constitutional
claim. The definition of the interests in the caregiver-child relationship
sufficient to establish constitutional standing, in the case of Mr. Newdow and
his daughter, should not have been held to be a matter of exclusive state
concern.
With respect to direct federal regulation of state activity, and in
particular federal laws that create a private cause of action for damages
against the states, recognizing a substantial federal interest in the welfare of
young citizens will make a real difference in the scope of federal legislative
power. In recent years, the Supreme Court has made it clear that Congress's
power to create a private cause of action against the states is barred under
the Eleventh Amendment, with the sole exception of those laws passed
pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 375 Legislation
passed with the goal of fostering the development of democratic citizens falls
within Congress's power to enforce the Citizenship Clauses under Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, and would therefore confer the power
on Congress to abrogate sovereign immunity in this area. A developmental
approach would allow Congress to enforce regulation against the states in
373. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2309 (2004) (discussing
the Court's deference to state law).
374. See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980); Indiana v.
Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 105 (1938).
375. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445, 454-55 (1976) (citing Ex parteVirginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880)).
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the areas of childcare, child support, health insurance, foster care, parental
substance abuse, domestic violence, and any other conditions bearing on the
early caregiving relationship. In its recent decision in Nevada v. Hibbs,3 76 the
Supreme Court found that the Family and Medical Leave Act created a
"congruent and proportional" legislative remedy for states' historical
discrimination against women who traditionally have been the primary
37
caregivers in their families, The developmental approach suggests an
alternative basis for the decision in Hibbs that relies on Congress's important
governmental interest not only in equality but also in childrearing, thus
providing additional constitutional grounding for the law and any future
expansions of its provisions relating to the work-family conflict.
Third, and finally, a developmental approach also recognizes that
federal regulatory power over families, while broad, is not plenary. A
developmental perspective tells us something about the limits that must be
set on the federal government's authority over the caregiving relationship.
This approach recognizes that the caregiving environment has a profoundly
important influence on the young child's developing mind. This insight
establishes both a basis for governmental involvement in ensuring the
familial preconditions to citizenship and also the need for carefully
circumscribing the exercise of federal power over children. Recognizing the
deeply formative influence of the early caregiving relationship reinforces the
importance of establishing strict limits on the federal government's power to
mold children in its own image. It is because early childrearing is so formative
of the individual that government must both be empowered to support it
and, at the same time, prohibited from exercising full control over it.
The national government already operates in the area of the family and
an unmodified concept of family privacy, like an unmodified idea of state
sovereignty, is a misguided fiction. But equally important is the recognition
of limits on federal legislative power to control families in a way that
conscripts young children into a particular state-defined way of life. 378 As the
Supreme Court explained over twenty years ago, "affirmative sponsorship of
particular ethical, religious, or practical beliefs is something we expect the
State not to attempt in a society constitutionally committed to the ideal of
individual liberty and freedom of choice."3 79 A limited principle of
federalism in the area of family law ensures that the federal government's
duty to support families will not be taken as a carte blanche for directing
young children into a uniform state-defined way of life. The principle
assumes there is no bright line between the private family and the State, and
376. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
377. Id. at 737, 740.
378. See Dailey, supra note 361, at 1792-93; Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L.
REv. 737, 739-40 (1989).
379. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (plurality opinion).
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seeks instead to determine the kinds of governmental action that usurp,
rather than reinforce, the family's childrearing role. Drawing the line
between federal legislation that "supports" families and federal legislation
that conscripts family life will not always be easy, but that is the required
constitutional task. It turns in part on the distinction between inculcating
particular moral values or life goals and securing the conditions that allow
individuals eventually to choose those values and goals for themselves.
The federalism principle places limits on congressional power to prefer
traditional family arrangements over non-traditional ones. The federal
government's marriage policies in the context of welfare reform, for
example,380 overstep the line by penalizing non-traditional families in the
absence of any solid empirical evidence that pro-marriage policies improve
the lives of children. There is some evidence that marriage correlates with
children's well-being,' but these studies draw causal conclusions that are
not supported by the data.182 The developmental view rejects the notion that
only the traditional family form or two-parent families can successfully
nurture children;3 8 3 from the perspective of child development, the only fact
that matters is the quality of early caregiving relationships. Indeed, denying
support to non-traditional caregivers would violate the deepest principles of
a developmental approach. The family's role in raising citizens involves
establishing stable, caregiving relationships with young children,
relationships that exist in non-traditional as well as in traditional family
settings. A focus on children's early developmental needs requires
recognizing the broad array of family arrangements that can successfully fill
the caregiving role. Stepparents, foster parents, grandparents, and many
others can all be central figures in the life of a child over time, and these
relationships-when primary in the young child's life-require
governmental support and constitutional protection.
The family remains a heavily state-regulated domain. The
developmental perspective provides a principled basis for allocating
380. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity and Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105; H.R. 4737, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 4, 108th Cong.
(2003).
381. See generally Ron Haskins, Sara McLanahan & Elisabeth Donahue, The Decline in
Marriage: What to Do, 15 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN (supplemental policy brief) (2005), available
at http://www.futureofchildren.princeton.edu/briefs/briefs/05_fall_marriage.pdf.
382. The problem for many of these families is not single parenthood, but poverty and
domestic violence. See generally Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Return of the Ring, 93 CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=729507; Julia M. Fisher, Marriage
Promotion Policies and the Working Poor: A Match Made in Heaven?, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 475,
478 (2005) (reviewing DAVID SHIPLER, THE WORKING POOR (2004)); Beth Skilken Catlett &Julie
E. Artis, Critiquing the Case for Marriage Promotion: How the Promarriage Movement Misrepresents
Domestic Violence Research, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1226 (2004).
383. See Iris Marion Young, Mothers, Citizenship, and Independence: A Critique of Pure Family
Values, 105 ETHICS 535, 536 (1995).
91 IOWA LAWREVIEW
regulatory and decisionmaking authority over most family law matters to the
states. Entry into marriage, the benefits and duties of marriage and civil
unions, the rights and responsibilities of parenthood, the definition of
paternity, new reproductive technologies, removal of children, termination
of parental rights, adoption, divorce, child custody, and compulsory
education laws are only a brief catalogue of the myriad ways in which
families are defined, regulated, and dissolved by state law. 1 4 Allocating this
regulatory power over the family to the states serves the prudential aim of
decentralizing authority over an area so formative of children's moral,
8815cultural, and social characters. Recent state efforts to recognize civil
unions and the debate over same-sex marriage, along with the passage of the
Defense of Marriage Act 3s 6 at the federal level, are powerful reminders of the
anti-tyranny, pro-democratic importance of state authority in the area of
family law. The developmental perspective recognizes that the federal
government has a responsibility for securing the familial preconditions to
citizenship at the same time that states retain authority over a core domain
of family law. In maintaining this balance between federal responsibility and
state power, the developmental perspective helps to ensure the long-term
success of a national polity whose survival depends on the complex
transmission of the psychological skills of democratic citizenship to future
generations.
V. CONCLUSION
By expanding on Brown's holding that citizenship requires tending to
the "hearts and minds" of young children, this Article aims to realize an
ideal of equal citizenship that emerged as one of the twentieth century's
crowning jurisprudential achievements. Developmental research contributes
to our understanding of the mature skills of reasoned thinking by revealing
the interplay between cognition and emotion, the vulnerability of reasoned
thinking to regressive emotional crises, and the familial pre-conditions to a
democratic citizenry's capacity for reasoned thinking. To borrow from
Justice Holmes, the Constitution most certainly does not enact Freud's
Interpretation of Dreams,"s but it does require that we understand and account
for the development of those psychological attributes of a citizenry capable
of fulfilling the highest aspirations of the constitutional enterprise.
The developmental approach presented in this Article offers a
comprehensive conceptual and empirical framework for rethinking the
384. For a more in-depth discussion of this point, see Dailey, supra note 10, at 997-1008.
385. See Dailey, supra note 361, at 1792-93.
386. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).
387. SIGMUND FREUD, THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS (George Aiken & Unwin, Ltd. and
The Macmillan Company 1915); see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("The 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statistics."
(referencing HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATISTICS (1851))).
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family's role in the democratic socialization of children. Every new
generation must be taught the habits of mind necessary for personal
autonomy and political self-rule. Schools, professional associations,
workplaces, religious groups, and political parties can all serve, in different
ways, to foster the required skills of reasoned thinking in both young
children and adult citizens. But what characterizes the family and sets it
apart from these diverse intermediate groupings is the important unifying
role it plays in fostering-generation after generation-the foundational
psychological processes of reasoned thinking. As this Article has explained,
our first, and arguably most important, political learning takes place in the
early caregiving relationship. It is through the internalization of the early
caregiving relationship that young children first take in the political world
and then, as their capacity for reasoned thinking unfolds, become full
members of that world in their own right.
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